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ABSTRACT 
By law, Sweden must reach net-zero emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 2045. 
Domestic transportation is one sector in which GHG emissions can be reduced substantially. 
Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) could potentially help with this and with the 
transition to a more efficient transportation system, but they could also instead make 
meeting the target harder. The issues of how CAV technology will be introduced to the 
general public and what the effects will be are fraught with uncertainty.  
 
Thus far, much policy research has been informed by technical, quantitative studies, such as 
the one in Paper 1 of this licentiate thesis. The study analyses the impact CAVs may have on 
travel demand. The methodology is based on an induced travel demand model that simulates 
the effects on Vehicle Kilometres Travelled (VKT) related to changes in Value of Travel 
Time (VoTT) and the cost of CAV technology. In our most conservative scenario—with the 
smallest change in VoTT and highest CAV cost—we estimate an average increase in travel 
distance by car of 5% once CAVs are a mature technology on the market, while this increase 
reaches 61% in the least conservative scenario. Our results also show that income matters: 
Under certain conditions, those who are able to work remotely and have a relatively high 
income have a greater economic incentive to purchase a CAV and extend their travel 
distance.  
 
In Paper 2, we identify and map the broader societal drivers and pressures for the 
introduction of CAVs in cities. The approach taken in the paper has a theoretical basis in 
transition management and stakeholder theories and uses a combination of the Drivers, 
Pressures, State, Impact, and Response (DPSIR) framework and force field analysis to 
analyse interview transcripts. Survey data complement this analysis. The results provide in-
depth knowledge about how actors in different parts of society perceive the introduction of 
CAVs and the mechanisms behind the expansion of these vehicles. It is clear from the 
interviews and survey that CAVs are not seen as unconditionally positive; instead, many 
stakeholders believe CAVs need to be connected to mobility planning and public transport 
strategies. 
 
Key words: Connected and Autonomous Vehicle, Value of Travel Time, travel demand, 
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ABSTRAKT PÅ SVENSKA 
 
Sverige ska enligt lag nå netto noll utsläpp av växthusgaser till år 2045. Inrikes transporter är 
en sektor där växthusgasutsläppen kan minskas avsevärt och självkörande fordon kan både 
eventuellt försvåra och hjälpa till med denna nödvändiga minskning av utsläppen och 
övergången till ett mer effektivt transportsystem. Det finns dock många osäkerheter om hur 
tekniken kommer att införas för allmänheten och vad dess effekter kommer att bli.  
 
Hittills har mycket politisk forskning informerats av tekniska, kvantitativa studier, som t.ex. 
Papper 1 i denna licentiatuppsats. I den studien analyserar vi vilken inverkan självkörande 
bilar kan ha på reseefterfrågan. Metoden baseras på en modell av inducerat resebehov som 
simulerar effekterna på körsträcka relaterade till förändringar i värdet av restid och kostnaden 
för den självkörande tekniken. I vårt mest konservativa scenario uppskattar vi en ökning av 
reseefterfrågan med 5% efter att tekniken (mer specifikt: connected and autonomous 
vehicles eller CAV) har blivit en mogen teknik på marknaden, medan ökningen av 
reseefterfrågan är 61% i scenariot med de största effekterna. Under vissa förhållanden visar 
resultaten större ekonomiskt incitamentet att köpa en CAV och förlänga körsträckan för den 
som kan arbeta på distans och har relativt hög inkomst. 
 
I Papper 2 identifierar och kartlägger vi de bredare samhälleliga drivkrafterna (drivers) och 
trycket (pressures) för införandet av självkörande bilar i städer. Tillvägagångssättet i 
uppsatsen har en teoretisk grund i transition management och stakeholder theories och 
använder en kombination av ett Drivers, Pressures, State, Impact and Response (DPSIR) 
ramverk och force field analysis för att analysera intervjuer. Denna analys kompletteras med 
enkätdata. Resultaten bidrar till ökad förståelse om hur aktörer i olika delar av samhället 
uppfattar införandet av självkörande bilar och mekanismerna bakom expansionen av dessa 
fordon. Det framgår tydligt av intervjuerna och undersökningen att självkörande bilar inte 
ovillkorligt ses som något positivt, utan att många intressenter snarare anser att självkörande 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
On January 1, 2018, Sweden’s Climate Policy Framework came into effect as national law. The 
Framework consists of a Climate Act, a policy council, and a set of goals that all contribute to 
Sweden’s main climate goal: net-zero emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 2045 and 
negative emissions after that (Bonde et al., 2020). This Framework is the result of domestic 
negotiations and research going back many years as well as Sweden’s commitments according to 
the 2015 Paris Agreement.  
 
What does this have to do with Connected and Autonomous Vehicles, i.e., CAVs? Well, that 
depends. The two articles in this licentiate thesis examine the potential effects that this 
technology could have on Swedish society, and if one looks at it purely from the perspective of 
reaching the net-zero carbon goal by 2045, CAVs1 could matter a lot. More specifically, they 
could help to reduce the 10.1 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent currently emitted each 
year by passenger cars in Sweden (Naturvårdsverket, 2020, p. 6). They could also contribute to a 
new transportation system that is more accessible, efficient, and affordable. However, this 
depends on how the technology is used. For example, potential user groups who were previously 
unable to drive could now use car; passengers could drastically increase the length and frequency 
of car trips because they would be able to use the time in the car for other activities; and when 
passengers are deposited at their destination, the empty CAV would continue driving to its next 
stop, therefore driving much farther than a conventional car (Annema, 2020).  Put together, 
these trends could cause a huge increase in emissions from passenger cars as well as other 
negative effects such as suburban sprawl (Moore et al., 2020; Pernestål et al., 2020).    
 
In order to avoid potential large-scale problems and steer towards the potential benefits of the 
technology, the introduction of CAV technology needs to be carefully planned and executed. 
And this planning would hopefully benefit from being informed by scientific research that 
carefully studies the possible scenarios that could be created by this yet relatively untested (at a 
societal level) technology. The papers included in this licentiate contribute to this research.  
 
1.1 Aims 
This licentiate thesis examines some of the potential indirect effects that CAVs could have on 
energy requirements and GHG emissions in Sweden, focussing, in particular, on answering the 
following questions: 
 
1. How might a change in Value of Travel Time induce an increase in travel demand? 
2. Which driving and restraining forces and pressures are important for the introduction of 
CAVs in cities? 
 
1 In this licentiate thesis CAVs are defined as level 4 vehicles as described by the SAE guidelines: 
https://www.sae.org/standards/content/j3016_201806/. We assume that these vehicles would exist as part of an 
interconnected system, thus we use the term Connected and Autonomous Vehicle or “CAV”.  
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1.2 Contributions 
In Paper 1, we analyse the impact CAVs may have on travel demand under certain conditions. 
The conceptual approach is based on a technology adoption model as well as an induced travel 
demand model that simulates the effects on Vehicle Kilometres Travelled (VKT) related to 
changes in Value of Travel Time and cost of CAV technology. This research builds on work by, 
for example, Wadud et al. (2016), Wadud (2017), and Taiebat et al. (2019). The results from the 
study could potentially be useful for transport and energy system planning and policy design. 
In Paper 2, we identify and map the broader societal drivers and pressures relevant to the 
introduction of CAVs in cities. The approach taken in the paper has a theoretical basis in 
transition management (Loorbach, 2010) and stakeholder theories (Caputo, 2013). The method 
combines the Drivers, Pressures, State, Impact and Response (DPSIR) framework—to analyse 
interview data (Adelfio et al., 2018)—and force-field mapping (Burnes & Cooke, 2012)—to 
complement this with survey data. The results from the second study provide in-depth 
knowledge about how actors in different parts of society perceive the introduction of CAVs and 
the mechanisms behind the expansion of these vehicles. 
1.3 Disposition 
The disposition of this thesis is as follows. Section 2 begins with a contextual explanation of the 
history of passenger cars in Sweden, mechanisms by which CAVs could affect energy use and 
CO2 emissions, Sweden’s goal for zero net GHG emissions by 2045, and a brief summary of 
where this thesis fits within those background topics. Sections 3 and 4 summarise the 
methodology and results of the appended papers. Section 5 discusses the scientific contributions 
of this thesis. Finally, Section 6 offers a brief outlook on future work. 
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Chapter 2  
Background 
2.1 The historical context: Sweden as a car-producing and car-driving nation 
 
Sweden has a long history of automobile production that has evolved into an industry based 
around cars, trucks, and other engines, with a focus on domestic innovation and technology 
development, while some of the production has moved abroad (Statistics Sweden, 2017). In 
2019, the automobile industry was responsible for BSEK 235 in exports, which is minimal on a 
global scale but represents 15% of Swedish exports (Bil Sweden, 2020, p. 36).   
 
The strength of the automobile industry is reflected in the broader Swedish economy. If the 
number of jobs in the automobile industry2 were to increase by 1 000, this would result in an 
additional 1 000 jobs in other industry sectors; this effect is among the largest in the 
manufacturing sector (Statistics Sweden, 2017). 
 
Automobile ownership is common in Sweden. In 2019, 4.9 million passenger cars were in use 
(Bil Sweden, 2020, p. 9), i.e., one car for every two people. The average distance travelled by a 
car owner was 11 710 kilometres (Trafikanalys a, 2020). In 2017, 35% of Swedes reported that 
they were completely dependent on a car (Bil Sweden, 2020, p. 19).  
 
Cars have also had a strong influence on Swedish infrastructure after World War II. In his 2014 
doctoral thesis “The Car Society: Ideology, Expertise and Rule-Making in Post-War Sweden”, 
Per Lundin studied the class of planning experts that appeared during the 1950s and 60s who 
were fascinated with the American model of a society built around cars (Lundin, 2014).  These 
experts, according to Lundin, also viewed the technical advancement and uptake of the 
automobile as a foregone conclusion, and thus the concept of urban and larger-scale national 
infrastructure planning based on cars was not considered to be a political matter, but simply a 
technical one. This is not an unknown phenomenon in the transportation literature. Mattioli et 
al. refer to it as “the creation of an apolitical facade around pro-car decision-making” (Mattioli et 
al., 2020, p. 1). In addition to the assumed impartiality of car technology, the separation of cars 
and other modes of traffic, especially pedestrian, was viewed as the best and safest way to guide 
planning. 
 
Lundin’s critique of this self-fulfilling planning process is that the problems of traffic accidents 
and congestion, which were already present in the 1950s and something that planning experts 
were trying to address, could have been solved in a number of other ways that did not give 
priority to cars. Many of the problems that resulted from mass car ownership, such as noise, air 
pollution and CO2 emissions, and what Lundin refers to as “torn-down and demolished city 
centres” (2014, p. 279) could thereby have been avoided. 
 
This interpretation of the development and subsequent effects of the “car society” is important 
to be aware of when studying today’s CAV development, because many of the same effects are 
already observable.  In fact, the foregone conclusion that CAVs will be developed and used by 
everyone in society, and the push towards creating special lanes just for CAV technology (Yu et 
al., 2019) are two examples of obvious parallels.  Stayton and Stilgoe (2020) summarise the issue: 
 
2 The automobile industry here includes suppliers and subcontractors, as well as automobile companies.  
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“A schema for innovation that points in one direction and says nothing about the desirability of 
the destination makes for a poor roadmap” (p. 1). They suggest that the levels of automation 
created by the Society for Automotive Engineers, originally as a common way for the accepted 
technical hierarchy of CAV technology to be widely understood, are now used in a way that 
suggests that full autonomy is the ultimate end goal, rather than as a tool for exploring different 
context-based scenarios that encompass more diverse-use cases. 
 
However, today there is a much more diverse international research apparatus studying CAV 
technology, policy, and potential societal effects. For example, there is already a push from the 
Swedish government for policy to be developed that will regulate CAVs in a socially equitable 
manner. In 2015, the government commissioned a public inquiry (offentlig utredning) to analyse 
which legal changes would be needed for an introduction of driving-supporting, and partial or 
fully self-driving, vehicles (Bjelfvenstam et al., 2018). The public inquiry suggests a number of 
changes to specific laws and provides context in terms of technological capabilities, societal 
effects, international law and policy, and vehicle use in Sweden. 
 
The public inquiry also suggests short-term and long-term actions that the government could 
take that are straightforward but mapped on a tight timeline. The report recommends that by 
2023, Swedish laws should be prepared for automated driving, most importantly to allow for the 
possibility of projects utilising advanced automated functions for platooning, goods 
transportation, and personal transportation (Bjelfvenstam et al., 2018, p. 35).  
 
More recently, the Swedish National Road and Transportation Research Institute (Statens väg- och 
transportforskningsinstitut, VTI) published a working paper that looks at policy instruments for self-
driving vehicles. This report is a useful overview of the existing literature on the subject and 
offers suggestions for how to internalise the externalities that could be caused by CAVs, as well 
as how to support their introduction, with the explicit acknowledgement that the requirements 
for this support remain unclear (Hammes, 2019).  
 
This section has provided a broad introduction to the historical context of passenger cars in 
Sweden and has shed light on the span of societal issues that can be affected by CAVs. In 
addition to providing relevant background information, this scope is in line with the aims of the 
second appended paper in this thesis. The next sections will further clarify the specific CAV-
related effect on GHG emissions and the academic and political forces already focussed on this 
issue. 
 
2.2 Climate policy: CAVs and the 2045 net-zero emissions goal  
The 2045 goal is not the first national Swedish GHG reduction goal. In 2009, the Swedish 
government voted to reduce GHG emissions by 40% by 2020, compared to 1990 levels. Sweden 
reached this goal (according to the calculation mechanisms in that particular framework) in 2012 
(Bonde et al., 2020, p. 10). However, this was largely due to actions commonly referred to as 
“low-hanging fruit”. The largest part of the reduction came from changes to heating systems in 
buildings, and relatively little came from transportation (Naturvårdsverket, 2020).  
 
Since 1990, the GHG emissions from domestic transportation in Sweden have fluctuated, 
peaking in 2007 and then mostly sinking slowly. In 2019, transportation emissions were 17% 
lower than 1990 levels (Naturvårdsverket, 2020). But if Sweden is going to reach the transport-
related targets that contribute to the net-zero goal, these emissions need to sink at a much faster 
pace.  
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When measuring transportation emissions, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 
(Naturvårdsverket) breaks this category into all the different modes of transportation used in 
Sweden. Passenger cars are by far the largest emitter, as can be seen in Error! Reference source 
not found..  
 
 
Figure 1: GHG Emissions from Domestic Transportation in Sweden (Statistics Sweden, 2020).  
Until now, much of the reduction in emissions from passenger cars has been attributed to 
increased use of biofuels and more energy-efficient vehicles (primarily through a larger share of 
diesel cars) (Naturvårdsverket, 2020). Electric vehicles have historically been a small part of 
emissions reductions, but the number of electric vehicles (including battery, plug-in hybrid, and 
hybrid electric vehicles) on the road in Sweden is increasing rapidly; their share of new vehicle 
registrations reached above 20% in 2019 (Trafikanalys b, 2020). 
 
In 2019, the Climate Policy Council recommended that the Swedish government “…begin 
preparing for a reform of road traffic taxation based on increased electrification and the use of 
autonomous vehicles, while promoting regional fairness” (Bonde et al., 2020, p. 51). CAVs do 
not feature prominently in these government reports about emissions reductions, but the 
technology has become salient enough to be mentioned. However, in their 2020 report, the 
Council noted that the while the government had planned to put a CAV-related tax within a 
larger tax reform, no concrete steps had been taken (Bonde et al., 2020). 
 
2.3 Mechanisms by which self-driving cars may affect GHG emissions  
A more formulaic way to look at how CAVs can affect emissions is to utilise the Activity, modal 
Share, energy Intensity of mode and carbon intensity of Fuel (ASIF) model, which is the basis 
for most calculations of transportation emissions. The formula is stated as (Schipper & Marie-
Lilliu, 1999): 
𝐸 =  𝐴 ∙  𝑆 ∙  𝐼 ∙  𝐹 
 
Where E is emissions, A is travel activity, S is structure, often represented as modal share, I is 
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ASIF was first published in a report by the International Energy Agency in 1999. The formula is 
based on years of empirical analysis on the links between energy intensity, transportation, and 
emissions in IEA member countries (Greening et al., 1997) and was also part of a larger effort to 
examine methods for analysing disaggregated energy indicators across different sectors in 
addition to transportation.   
 
The approach to mathematically analyse the relationship between human activity and GHG 
emissions in a simplified framework is perhaps best known through the IPAT formula, which 
was developed by Ehrlich and Holdren (1971). In 1990, Kaya created a formula that came to be 
known as the “Kaya Identity”, which applied IPAT specifically to carbon dioxide (or carbon 
dioxide equivalent), and explicitly considered energy consumption as one term of the equation, 
thus opening the door for ASIF and other decomposition formulas (Kaya, 1990). The two 
formulas are written out below. 
 
I =  P ∙  A ∙  T 
 
IPAT, where I is environmental impact, P is population, A is affluence, and T is technology. 
 











The Kaya Identity, where F is global anthropogenic CO2 emissions, P is population, G is GDP, 
and E is energy consumption. 
 
The ASIF formula provides a tidy structure for reviewing existing academic literature that 
connects CAVs with GHG emissions. The articles discussed below do not all make explicit 
mention of ASIF, but they provide insight into the makeup of each term in the formula and thus 
create an important background for understanding how transportation in general, and CAVs in 
particular, contributes to changes in energy use and GHG emissions. As noted by Schipper and 
Marie-Lilliu in their original 1999 report, the ASIF terms are interrelated, and it can be difficult 
to separate them into distinct, quantifiable categories. But it is helpful to try and do so in order 
to at least identify the components of each term and then address how those components can 
change and affect one another.  
 
It is important to note here that there is an extra level of difficulty involved when trying to 
understand how CAVs could impact the [A] and [S] parts of the ASIF formula, because the 
research is effectively about a technology that, despite the ostentatious advertisements 
(Hildebrand & Sheller, 2018), does not exist in everyday life. CAV technology has not yet been 
disseminated at a societal level. Very few people can say that they have experienced fully 
automated vehicle technology, beyond what are considered to be level 2 characteristics such as 
lane-centring and adaptive cruise control3. Those who have used fully automated vehicle 
technology will have done so on a closed course, which is a far cry from the system of connected 
vehicles that the most optimistic models describe.  
 
However, as discussed below, many researchers have addressed this by using stated preferences, 
proxies in the form of chauffeured vehicles or other forms of transportation, or acceptance 
levels for other technology. 
 
 
3 For more information on the SAE levels see: https://www.sae.org/standards/content/j3016_201806/  
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By definition, all literature examining transportation behaviour looks at the [A] and the [S] terms 
travel activity and modal share. Our key interest here is travel activity with passenger cars, which 
then is [A]*[S], and we go less into how [A] and [S] separately may be affected by CAV. One 
recent study on how CAVs may affect activity analysed how chauffeur services provided to 
subjects affect mobility patterns, finding that total VKT across the sample group increased by 
83% during the time that the research subjects had access to a chauffeur (Harb et al., 2018). In 
their 2019 study, Wadud and Huda surveyed people in two cities in Bangladesh to find out what 
passengers are most likely to do while being chauffeured, as a proxy for what people might do 
with their time in a CAV. They found that there was a correlation between what the research 
subjects did in their chauffeured vehicles and what researchers have suggested people might do 
in CAVs, in particular that “the travel time in a car is used by travellers to conduct work-related 
or other worthwhile activities” (Wadud & Huda, 2019, p. 1), which suggests that passengers 
could have an incentive to increase their VKT.  
 
Some studies collect stated preference data about specific scenarios involving a CAV, after 
providing respondents with some kind of written explanation of what the technology looks like 
(Moore et al., 2020) or a video that demonstrates the scenario (Pudāne et al., 2019). Moore et al. 
(2020) used survey data to model how different behavioural dimensions could affect the decision 
to relocate if the individual can commute with a private CAV, and found that the resulting 
potential urban sprawl could be as large as a 68% increase in the horisontal spread of some cities. 
Pudāne et al. (2019) took data from focus groups to model the re-arrangement of daily activities 
resulting from on-board activities in a CAV and found that time pressure could be eased 
depending on the re-arrangement of daily activity patterns. 
 
Others have circumvented the collection of data by creating models based on existing 
information and literature. Lavasani et al. (2016) developed a market penetration model for CAV 
adoption, based in part on past acceptance of technology such as the internet and cellphones. 
Their results show that a larger market is connected to a higher adoption rate, and CAV cost did 
not strongly influence diffusion. Other findings from theoretical modelling include those 
produced by Wadud et al. (2016) on the potential changes in energy demand caused by different 
levels of CAV adoption and Wadud (2017) on the levels of CAV adoption in different 
transportation sectors and subsequent changes in travel demand. In the latter study, the value of 
the travel time, VoTT, emerges as an important characteristic (due to its relatively large share of 
GTC). Taiebat et al. (2019), who use a similar methodology to Wadud (2017), also find VoTT to 
have a significant influence on travel demand. 
 
The energy intensity [I] component is intrinsically related to the number of passengers (this has 
been empirically demonstrated across different travel modes by Schäfer and Yeh, 2020). There is 
much research on the effects of shared versus private CAVs (Pernestål & Kristoffersson, 2019), 
and also passenger preferences in terms of sharing (Malokin et al., 2019). The human 
behavioural factor is potentially more important than any technological gains in efficiency, 
because the largest calculated emissions reductions have been shown to come from vehicle 
sharing. For example, Pernestål and Kristofferson found that in 26 simulation studies of CAVs, 
only those that looked at taxis and shared taxis produced reductions in VKT (2019). 
 
Some of the emissions reductions that fall under the energy intensity component are related to 
eco-driving habits that humans could implement themselves, but usually do not. When the 
majority of vehicles on the road are CAVs, emissions reductions are also expected as the vehicles 
will work together to drive more efficiently, for example through platooning, more efficient 
intersections, etc.,  and through smaller, more efficient vehicles as these become more realistic, 
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especially if the CAVs are shared and the right size of vehicle is matched to the requirement of 
the ride (Wadud et al., 2016).  
 
Lee and Kockelman (2019) estimate a net energy reduction of 11-55% compared to current 
ground transportation conditions in the US, based on different use and technology scenarios for 
CAVs. This includes the possibility of CAV electrification, which is also related to the fuel 
carbon content [F] term of ASIF, since in this case the electricity would be the vehicle’s fuel, and 
if it comes from a renewable source the electricity could have a very low carbon content. Much 
research about CAV electrification tends to be part of studies that examine systemic effects of, 
for example, automated, electrified, and shared vehicles. For example, Fulton (2018) warned that 
while electrical and autonomous vehicles could create important benefits, they could also 
contribute to congestion and urban sprawl if not combined with shared transportation systems. 
Arbib and Seba (2017) suggested a very optimistic scenario where autonomous and electric 
vehicle fleets could drastically lower travel costs. Looking at a more specific group of scenarios, 
Compostella et al. (2020) found that battery electric vehicles could be cost-competitive with 
internal combustion engine vehicles by around circa 2030-2035. 
 
Finally, there are studies that examine broad societal effects of CAVs and thus extend beyond 
the ASIF framework. Milakis et al.’s 2017 article on the interrelated ripple effects of CAVs is a 
good example of this. There, the effects of CAVs are organised into first-, second-, and third-
order effects, and visualised by concentric circles with the CAVs at the centre. The first-order 
effects, closest to the centre, include traffic, travel cost, and travel choices, the second-order 
effects include vehicle ownership and sharing, location choices and land use, and transport 
infrastructure, and the third-order effects are “wider societal implications”, such as energy 
consumption, air pollution, safety, social equity, economy, and public health (Milakis et al., 2017, 
p. 326). The ripple effect concept is applied in such a way that the effects can be interrelated 
across widely ranging time frames, and the authors conclude that first-order, short-term benefits 
are expected to be beneficial, while third-order effects are unclear (Milakis et al., 2017). 
 
One more example of a study that examines broader effects of CAVs is that by Pernestål et al. 
(2020). They took a novel approach in this field and used causal loop diagrams to map the 
systemic effects that CAVs could have, in order to inform policy suggestions with respect to 
working towards the UN sustainable development goals. The findings suggest that vehicular-
level benefits of CAVs, such as fewer accidents per vehicle, are negated at a system level where 
an increase in VKT results in an increase in total accidents (Pernestål et al., 2020). 
 
In this licentiate thesis, when examining the case of CAVs for personal transportation in the first 
article, the focus is on 𝐴 ∙  𝑆, in terms of the estimation of induced travel demand. The other 
factors are not directly analysed in Paper 1. In the second article, the study touches on all of the 
components, though it does not provide quantitative measurements and tends to focus on 𝐴 and 
𝑆. 
  
However, the results of Paper 2 could be used as the basis for future work that would inform 
quantitative assumptions. For example, the 𝐴 component could be informed by the driving 
forces that came up in the interviews, such as urban planning, which is related to city-level 
policies that encourage CAV use; the 𝑆 component could be informed by market economy, 
which is related to vehicle sales and mobility-as-a-service (MaaS) business models; the 𝐼 
component could be related to sociocultural habits, which include uptake of shared CAVs; and 
the 𝐹 component could be related to the driving force of technological advance, which includes 
CAV and its potential synergies with vehicle electrification. 
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2.4 Context for this licentiate 
We can now reason that there is an empirical basis for the theory that CAVs could help reduce 
GHG emissions from transport in Sweden, given that (1) Sweden has historically been, and still 
is, a car-dependent country, where passenger cars have historically contributed, and continue to 
contribute, to a large share of GHG emissions; (2) there are many theoretically proven scenarios 
(based on the academic literature reviewed in Section 2.2) for how CAVs could help to reduce 
GHG emissions from passenger cars; and, further, (3) there is an incentive for the Swedish 
government to reduce emissions as much as possible.  
 
To reach the 2045 goal, GHG emissions must be reduced by an average of 6-10% per year in 
Sweden. The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency states that domestic transport is 
“crucial” for this trajectory (Naturvårdsverket, 2020, p. 13). As described in detail in Section 2.3, 
CAVs could have large effects in terms of reducing or increasing VKT, energy use by passenger 
cars, and also CO2 emissions, either from end-of-pipe if the vehicles are fuelled by fossil fuels or 
through electricity generation needed for powering electric vehicles as well as the carbon 
footprint of vehicle and battery production. The research in Paper 1 examines in more detail one 
way that CAVs could contribute to an increase in VKT and consequently energy use and CO2 
emissions. The research in Paper 2 places the introduction of CAVs within a broader 
sociotechnical context and examines the underlying forces that could lead to different CAV 
scenarios within cities. 
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Chapter 3  
Paper 1 
3.1 Introduction to research questions 
As noted in the previous section, there is a need for empirical and theoretical insights on 
potential CAV-introduction and -adoption scenarios. In Paper 1, we make a contribution to this 
strand of literature by analysing the impact that CAVs may have on travel demand under certain 
conditions, using a technology adoption model linked with an induced travel demand model to 
simulate the effects on VKT related to changes in Value of Travel Time and the cost of CAV 
technology. This work builds on that done by, primarily, Wadud et al. (2016), Wadud (2017), and 
Taiebat et al. (2019). 
 
The central question is how much not needing to actively drive could affect VoTT, and how this 
in turn will affect travel demand. Wadud et al. (2016) did an analysis based on the potential 
relative reduction in VoTT for US drivers due to CAV adoption, and an assumption about GTC 
elasticities. Their estimated changes in travel demand ranged from a 4% increase with low levels 
of automation, to a 60% increase with CAV adoption. Taiebat et al. (2019) used data from the 
US National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) to create an empirically estimated demand 
function and found a 2-47% increase in travel demand.  
 
These studies assume that CAVs will be adopted by the whole population. However, Wadud 
(2017) analysed under which conditions  in terms of costs and income level CAVs would be 
cheaper than conventional vehicles using a break-even net present value calculation. They found 
that CAV “adoption” (that is, the cost of CAVs being favourable to that of conventional 
vehicles) is closely influenced by income level since the VoTT is strongly dependent on income. 
 
VoTT can be examined as one part of a greater range of variables that could be affected by 
CAVs, for example by causing ripple effects through society (Compostella et al., 2020; Milakis et 
al., 2017).  This type of analysis has provided inspiration for our study, but we first focus on 
conditions for CAV adoption and then on the first-order effects (as referred to by Milakis et al.) 
of changes in travel demand, in a Swedish context. The research questions that we seek to 
answer are: 
 
1. What is the relationship between income, value of travel time, and break-even costs for 
CAV adoption? 
2. How could CAV adoption have an impact on travel distance for individuals in Sweden, 
based on historical data from the Swedish Travel Survey? 
 
3.2 Methodology and reflection on methodology 
3.2.1 Generalised Travel Cost 
The Generalised Travel Cost (GTC) captures the full levelised cost of travelling per unit 
distance. In a high-income country such as Sweden, the VoTT tends to make up a large portion 
of a person’s Generalised Travel Cost (GTC) (Small & Verhoef, 2007). This can be seen in 
Figure 2, showing the estimated GTC for different income quintiles in Sweden for a scenario 
representing year 2050. 
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GTC includes the fixed cost, meaning vehicle depreciation with respect to calendar age, and 
variable cost, meaning fuel cost and vehicle depreciation with respect to mileage, operation and 
maintenance, and VoTT. The vehicle depreciation with respect to mileage is assumed to be one-
third of the annual depreciation for an average car (Trafikverket, 2018). There are two key 
components of GTC that could change because of CAVs: the VoTT and the capital cost of the 
vehicle. The extra capital cost is likely to be associated with the sensors (lidars, radars, cameras, 
etc.) and the processing power needed for automated driving.  
 
While the use of GTC for estimating changes in travel behaviour has been criticized by some 
(Wardman & Toner, 2018), its use is justified here because it has some theoretical and empirical 
support and is used in many traffic simulation models employed by national transport authorities 




Figure 2. Generalised Travel Cost (GTC) for a conventional car measured per kilometre, without CAV technology, in 
2050 by Swedish income quintiles. The percentage shown in the light green sections is the share of GTC represented 
by VoTT. Yes indicates ability to work remotely; No indicates inability to work remotely. 
 
3.2.2 Modelling based on Value of Travel Time (VoTT) 
Much of the economic benefit expected to result from the introduction of CAVs (and thus 
much of the hype as well) is related to the change in use of time for the person who may no 
longer have to actively drive the vehicle. In a CAV, the (former) driver would instead be able to 
work, relax, or engage in other activities (Pudāne et al., 2018; Wardman et al., 2019), and this 
could change how their time spent travelling is valued (Becker, 1965; DeSerpa, 1971), i.e., could 
change the VoTT. The VoTT, how much the time that a person spends travelling is worth, i.e., 
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VoTT is already commonly used in many countries as a part of the method for assessing 
potential transportation investments (Ortúzar & Willumsen, 2011), often as part of a larger cost-
benefit analysis (CBA). In Paper 1, we assume that passengers will use VoTT as part of a 
personal CBA when they decide whether to purchase a self-driving car. We assume the traveller 
would purchase a CAV if the levelised GTC is lower than the corresponding estimate for a 
conventional car. As mentioned above, the two key aspects of GTC expected to be different 
between a conventional vehicle and a CAV are VoTT and the capital cost of the vehicle.   
 
The concept of time valuation was developed by Gary Becker in 1965 when he proposed that 
the opportunity cost of time is equal to a person’s wage rate (Becker, 1965). Johnson (1966), 
Oort (1969), and De Serpa (1971) further developed the theory and differentiated between, for 
example, the value of leisure time and that of time spent travelling. How VoTT is calculated, 
disaggregated, and used in transport appraisal projects has been studied in detail by, for example, 
Börjesson and Eliasson (2014, 2019), in particular regarding how VoTT can be differentiated 
amongst population groups in terms of transportation mode, income, and other circumstances.  
Nordström (2020) has gone a step further and examined “…the actual justifications of the 
assumption of complete transferability between money and time…”. 
 
Paper 1 is based on a theoretical model of VoTT and how it may be affected by CAVs; the 
model is mainly built on the reasoning developed by Oort (1969). The VoTT that we use can be 
understood as the marginal value of leisure time plus the monetary value of the disutility of 
spending time in the vehicle. The marginal value of leisure is equal to the wage rate less the 
disutility of working. Therefore, the formula for our calculated VoTT can be conceptually 
summarised as: 
 
𝑉𝑜𝑇𝑇 =  𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 +  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 
 
The opportunity cost of time in this case is the value of giving up a leisure activity (or work, 
which is wage rate less the disutility of working) that could have been done instead. The VoTT 
could change if the vehicle is a CAV, since the person might not need to “give up” the leisure or 
work activity they would otherwise be doing. The monetary value of the disutility of spending 
time in the vehicle is, if possible, more intangible, but one can suggest that this value could 
change with CAV technology because the person might enjoy their time in the vehicle more, 
implying a reduced disutility. Thus, in absolute terms, both components could be decreased, and 
so their sum (VoTT) would also decrease. 
 
Many academic studies examine changes in VoTT in relation to CAVs (Bansal & Kockelman, 
2017; Gao et al., 2019; Harb et al., 2018; Pudāne et al., 2018, 2019; Pudāne & Correia, 2020; 
Wadud & Huda, 2019; Wardman et al., 2019). A change in VoTT can be analysed in terms of the 
reason for the change, which depends on what the traveller is able to do in the vehicle, and the 
magnitude of the change, which depends on the utility that the traveller gains from that activity. 
The reason for a change in VoTT could be related to an increase in subjective well-being 
(Singleton, 2019), multitasking (Malokin et al., 2019), or work (Correia et al., 2019). The 
magnitude of the change is very difficult to approximate, and there is considerable debate about 
the usefulness of travel-based multitasking and a connection to lower VoTT (Cyganski et al., 
2015; Singleton, 2019).  
 
Without explicitly considering CAVs, the International Transport Forum (ITF) suggests that 
VoTT could be reduced by 20-25% if travellers were able to do something with their time. Gao 
et al. (2019) analysed stated preference survey data on ride-hailing services and found a 13-45% 
reduction in VoTT with use of ride-hailing services compared to a personal vehicle during 
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commuting trips. In terms of assumptions on VoTT changes, Singleton (2019) reviewed a 
number of studies that made VoTT assumptions in relation to CAVs, and found that the 
assumptions spanned a wide range based on different contexts, ranging from no change to a 
100% change.   
 
The scenarios presented in this article assume that there are differences between VoTT for 
commuting and for other activities, following Correia (2019), who found VoTT during a 
commute should be lower using theoretical and empirical (stated choice) methods. The reduction 
in VoTT during commuting is assumed to be larger in some of the scenarios, which then is 
reflected in the modelled changes in GTC and travel distances. We also assumed that VoTT 
increases linearly with income. The elasticity of VoTT with respect to income is uncertain, 
though some empirical studies suggest that it could be close to or slightly below unity (Mackie et 
al., 2001; Wardman et al., 2016). Börjesson & Eliasson, (2014) analysed two Swedish VoTT 
studies performed 13 years apart and found that income elasticity with respect to VoTT 
increases with income, being close to zero when below the median income and unity or higher 
above the median income. 
 
In addition to this, some transport authorities assume an income elasticity of unity to account for 
income growth when they analyse projects that will have an impact on travel over a longer time 
frame (Trafikverket, 2018; UK Department for Transport, 2019). Thus, we adjust VoTT to 
reflect different income quintiles, using the Swedish Transportation Authority’s VoTT for the 
median income quintile and a VoTT income elasticity of unity.  
 
3.2.3 Elasticities and induced travel demand 
There are two important effects that connect a change in GTC to a change in travel demand: (1) 
the rebound effect, in which increased fuel efficiency tends to lead to a lower marginal cost of 
travel, which in turn leads to increased mileage (Small & Van Dender, 2007); and (2) the induced 
travel effect, where improved “speed” in going from A to B by, for example, new highway 
capacity and/or reduced congestion, tends to generate more travel (Goodwin, 1996). In the first 
case, the fuel cost component of GTC is reduced; in the second, the VoTT per km is reduced, in 
that less time is needed. 
 
The theoretical and empirical findings for the price-responsive behaviour to fuel-price changes, 
the rebound effect through energy efficiency improvements, and induced travel demand through 
infrastructure and congestion-mitigation projects show that a reduced GTC will have an impact 
on travel demand. Results that suggest that the rebound effect declines as income declines offer 
one example of components of GTC interacting with the mechanisms stated above, since fuel 
cost as share of GTC typically declines as VoTT increases (Greene, 2012; Small & Van Dender, 
2007). In terms of empirical effects, studies have shown a long-run rebound effect of around 
0.1-0.3, (elasticity of travel distance with respect to fuel cost per km), meaning that a 10% 
increase in fuel efficiency would generate a 1-3% increase in annual VKT (D. Andersson et al., 
2019; Dimitropoulos et al., 2018). The long-run induced travel demand elasticity has been 
estimated to be in the order of -0.5 to -1 (elasticity of travel distance with respect to travel time 
from A to B), in the sense that a 10% reduction in travel time tends to induce a 5-10% increase 
in travel volume from (M. Andersson & Smidfelt Rosqvist, 2011; De Jong & Gunn, 2001; 
Goodwin, 1996).  
 
The concept of elasticity of travel distance with respect to GTC (Goodwin, 1996) unifies the 
rebound effect and the induced travel effect (see Supplementary Materials Section 2) at the end 
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of Paper 1 for further analysis of this). The derived relationship between the induced travel 









Where T is time per unit of distance, VoTT is value of travel time per unit of time, and C is fuel 
cost per unit of distance. 
 
Furthermore, the relationship between change in distance travelled, change in GTC, and 








∆(𝐶 + 𝑂 + 𝑇 ∙ 𝑉𝑜𝑇𝑇)
𝐶 + 𝑂 + 𝑇 ∙ 𝑉𝑜𝑇𝑇
 
 
Where D is distance, G is variable general cost of travel per unit of distance, and O is other 
variable travel costs per unit of distance. Using estimates from the literature discussed above and 
the derivation in Paper 1 SM2, this formula gives a demand elasticity with respect to variable 
GTC (𝜀𝐺) of about -1 (with a substantial uncertainty interval). 
  
3.3 Results 
We created three scenarios, each based on a different VoTT and cost of CAV technology, see 
Table 1. For each scenario, we applied the changes in VoTT and technology cost to the existing 
data on travel patterns and GTC, disaggregated by income quintile. Little is a scenario that 
loosely follows the results described in the 2019 ITF report (ITF, 2019), where automation has a 
relatively small effect on travel patterns. Following the findings of Correia et al. (2019) and Gao 
et al. (2019), Little assumes that time spent commuting will see a greater change in VoTT from 
CAV than time spent travelling for other reasons.  In Medium, we assume the same reduction in 
VoTT from CAV for commuting as for other travel, in line with Wadud et al (2016) and Taiebat 
et al. (2019), who assign the same impact due to CAVs on VoTT irrespective of trip purpose. In 
Large, we reflect the findings of Harb et al. (2018), in which CAV technology has a great impact 
on utility and causes a substantial reduction in VoTT. The cost of the technology is low in Large.   
 
Scenario Reduction in VoTT 
Other* 
Reduction in VoTT 
Commuting and 
working in the car 
Cost of CAV 
technology 
Little 15% 25% 100 000 SEK 
Medium 35% 35% 50 000 SEK 
Large 50% 60% 30 000 SEK 
Table 1: Scenarios for induced travel demand in Paper 1. Column two shows the reduction in VoTT for non-
commuting trips for everyone, and for commuting trips for those who cannot work remotely. 
 
3.3.1 Changes in GTC 
The changes in GTC in each scenario illustrate which groups benefit versus lose from investing 
in CAV technology. The groups are divided into different income quintiles, which are further 
divided into those who can work remotely or not, as mentioned above in the Table 1 caption. 
The ten different groups have different annual travel distances and different VoTTs. The cost of 
CAV technology differs across scenarios, but not, for a given scenario, among the ten groups. 
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The effect of CAV usage on VoTT differs across scenarios and, for the Little and Large 
scenarios, between those who can work remotely or not. 
 
The benefit and cost of investing in a CAV can be seen in Figure 3. In both Large and Medium, 
investing in a CAV is beneficial for all income groups, while in Little, the results are mixed. One 
important point to look at is quintile 4 in Little, for which investing in a CAV yields a negative 
net benefit for those who cannot work remotely, while it is positive for those who can work 
remotely. This demonstrates the potential break-even point where it becomes economically 




Figure 3: Change in GTC due to CAV in each scenario. The green bar shows the net reduction in VoTT per km due to 
operating a CAV as compared to a conventional car, the grey bar shows the increase in cost per km due to the CAV 
technology, while the black diamond shows the difference in GTC (positive indicates that GTC is lower with a CAV). 
Yes indicates ability to work remotely; No indicates inability to work remotely. 
3.3.2 Changes in travel demand 
The changes in total travel demand are greatest in Large, with a 61% increase overall, while 
Medium shows an increase of 32% overall, and Little has just a 5% increase overall, see Figure 4. 
Generally, higher income groups show a larger change in travel distance irrespective of scenario. 
This is because these groups have a larger VoTT and thus have both stronger incentive to adopt 
a CAV even if the relative impact on VoTT is small and the cost of technology is high. The 
incentive to adopt as well as the relatively smaller reduction in VoTT is why we in Little only 
observe travel distance increases in the higher income groups and also relatively small impacts 
within these groups.   
 
The connection to income exposes a potential inequality among income groups that can most 
clearly be seen in Little, but also in the other scenarios though impact of travel demand may be 
greater in these groups. In Little, the average increase in travel demand is just 5%, but the 
increase for those who are able to work remotely in the car in the fifth (highest) income quintile 
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Figure 4: Changes in travel distance for each scenario. This shows the increase in travel distance for each group and 
scenario, in blue. The first column on the left (Total) shows the total daily increase in travel distance averaged across 
all groups in each scenario, in yellow. Yes indicates ability to work remotely; No indicates inability to work remotely. 
 
We performed a sensitivity analysis on the elasticity with respect to the variable part of the GTC 
to see how sensitive the changes in travel demand are due to different assumptions. The analysis 
showed that the higher the elasticity, the larger the induced travel difference between scenarios. 
This holds for all scenarios and all income groups when a CAV is adopted.  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
In Paper 1, we model and analyse the effect that CAV technology could have on travel demand 
in Sweden based on travel habits as reported in the national travel survey and changes in the 
GTC, given a change in VoTT and the cost of vehicle technology. Our results show that: 
 
• It was found in the initial data analysis that those in the higher income quintiles, and 
those who are able to work remotely, tend to have longer travel distances. The groups 
with a higher income also tend to have a higher VoTT, based on our assumption of a 
linear relationship between VoTT and income. 
 
• Thus, as long as all income groups have the same change in technology price (i.e., the 
CAV technology cost) and relative change in VoTT, the higher income groups will in all 
cases we analysed have a larger (absolute) economic incentive to adopt a CAV, due to the 
larger absolute change in VoTT and the fact that the cost of CAV technology can be 













Total Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
1 2 3 4 5
Little 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 0% 17% 12%
Medium 32% 21% 20% 28% 27% 32% 30% 35% 35% 42% 41%














Changes in travel distance for each Scenario
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• Any prolonged increase in travel distance, such as that shown in our model, could 
eventually lead to serious effects on congestion, increased overall energy needs of the 
transport sector, and increased CO2 emissions from fossil fuels used in operating the 
vehicle as well as in the production of energy carriers and the vehicle itself. These results 
could be useful for policymakers when future scenarios involving CAVs are being 
considered and also useful for future research on travel demand and CAVs. 
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Chapter 4  
Paper 2 
4.1 Introduction to research questions 
Exploring the perceived causes behind the introduction of CAV technology can provide a better 
understanding of what assumptions are reasonable for models that simulate CAV use. On a 
societal level, the introduction of CAVs “not only entail[s] new technologies, but also changes in 
markets, user practices, policy and cultural meanings” (Geels, 2010) and will imply transitions 
that intervene at different levels—e.g., cultural, structural, and practical—within different time 
frames and different geographic scales (Loorbach, 2010, p. 171).  
 
With this context in mind, in Paper 2 we examine the introduction of CAVs in cities in terms of 
the indirect or underlying processes (drivers) and the direct expressions of interest that are 
related to specific actions, events, or processes (pressures) (Adelfio et al., 2018). In order to 
capture perspectives from all parts of society, the drivers and pressures are identified by 
stakeholders from across the quadruple helix: academia, industry, government, and civil society. 
We use a composite analytical framework that combines parts of DPSIR modelling and force 
field analysis to map the driving and restraining forces and pressures behind the introduction of 
CAVs in cities, and to identify which stakeholders are involved in this sociotechnical transition. 
 
The research questions we seek to answer are: 
1. What are the driving and restraining forces and pressures that facilitate or hinder the 
sociotechnical transition towards the introduction of CAVs at the city level?  
 
2. What stakeholders, representative of the aforementioned driving/restraining forces and 
pressures, are involved in such a sociotechnical transition? 
 
4.2 Methodology and reflection on methodology 
4.2.1 A qualitative approach to studying CAV introduction  
Cohen et al. (2020) argue for the increased use of social science in CAV research. They suggest 
that “failing to anticipate a wider range of profound social implications may have serious 
negative consequences”, and that “social scientists from a range of disciplinary perspectives can 
provide invaluable insights”. Much of this reasoning is based on the idea that CAVs will be 
introduced in diverse circumstances, even when just examining one country, and public 
engagement will be crucial for a just and safe dissemination of the technology.  
 
In relation to this, it is interesting to consider suggested alternatives and criticisms of traditional 
cost-benefit analysis and other quantitative analysis of transport-related impacts (such as those 
occurring from the introduction of CAVs). Van Wee and Roeser have made a case for a 
“context-sensitive approach”, which considers multiple morally relevant features in a given 
situation (2013), largely using deontological ethics and contractarianism. One of their suggestions 
is that by addressing the ethically relevant aspects of a situation and selecting an ethical theory by 
which to evaluate it, the moral implications of the situation (e.g., a transportation policy or 
infrastructure project) become clearer and can hopefully be addressed. I would argue that before 
one can identify the ethically relevant aspects of a particular situation, one must first examine 
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how different stakeholders perceive (for example) the introduction of a new technology, as we 
do in Paper 2.  
We study the salient sociotechnical aspects involved in the introduction of CAV technology by 
applying a framework that looks at the drivers (D), pressures (P), states (S), impacts (I), and 
responses (R) related to the introduction of CAV technology in Sweden, primarily in 
Gothenburg. This framework is known as DPSIR, and it was originally created by the European 
Environment Agency as a tool to give “structure within which to present the indicators needed 
to enable feedback to policy makers on environmental quality” (Kristensen, 2004, p. 1). It is a 
causal-chain framework that has traditionally been used for identifying driving forces related to 
land-use change. DPSIR is mainly used in environmental assessment projects, but we apply it to 
the introduction of a new technology in order to capture the types of insights discussed by 
Cohen et al. We also merge it with a second analytical tool, force field analysis, to create a 
composite analytical framework where we can map the strength of the D and P elements of 
DPSIR (Adelfio et al., 2018). 
We conducted eleven semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from all parts of the 
quadruple helix structure—academia, government, industry, and civil society—and then used 
directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) to identify drivers and pressures in the 
interview transcripts. We used the resulting pressures to create a survey that asked respondents 
to assign a level of strength—weak, medium, or strong—to each pressure. 
Both the identification and subsequent mapping of the drivers and pressures are included in the 
force field analysis process. Field theory, which is the basis for force field analysis, suggests 
mapping psychological forces that influence the behaviour of an individual or group in order to 
understand said behaviour (Lewin & Korsch, 1939). We combine force field analysis with 
DPSIR, and in doing so we address some of the criticisms of DPSIR; the most common being 
that it does not address the complexity of the processes that it attempts to analyse (Niemeijer, 
2008). The DPSIR framework was useful in that it allowed us to capture the breadth of 
perspectives that we were searching for, and to organise the interview data in a way that made it 
possible to do further analysis, without reducing the diversity or quality of information.  
There are many other frameworks traditionally used to examine technological transitions, two of 
the most prominent being the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) (Rip et al., 1998) and 
Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) (Bergek et al., 2008). TIS examines the dynamics of 
systems and is certainly a good tool for looking at system-wide introduction of CAVs but does 
not encompass the more granular perspective that we were aiming to take. 
MLP has its base in sociology, innovation studies, and institutional theory and explicitly 
categorizes the system in question into levels in order to better examine the forces at play. It is 
complementary to DPSIR in a sense, in that both examine directional forces of change. 
However, while the theory behind MLP was helpful for framing parts of this work, it was less 
useful for the practical organisation and analysis of the extensive information we were collecting. 
Our research here was perhaps one or two steps too early for the full application of MLP 
because our goal was to identify and map out the relevant factors that have a noticeable expected 
effect when imagining the introduction of CAVs in cities. DPSIR was a useful framework to 
organise all the information and to portray it without having to further categorize the drivers or 
pressures. Instead, we used force field analysis together with the DPS components to evaluate 
the drivers and pressures affecting change (Thomas, 1985). This combination of DPS and force 
field analysis is represented in Figure 5. 




Figure 5: A simplified diagram of the composite analytical framework we used in Paper 2, combining force field 
mapping and the DPS components of DPSIR. 
When using MLP, the interactions between different aspects of the framework are very 
important, and while we discuss interactions in our conclusions, we do not explicitly consider 
them in the analysis. In fact, we had such rich data that we abbreviated the framework to only 
include the drivers, pressures and state in Paper 2 and plan to write a separate paper on the state, 
impacts and responses. 
 
4.3 Results  
In this section, I will first provide an overview of all the driving and restraining forces and 
pressures that were identified in the interviews, first in a brief summary and then in a longer table 
format. The tables show how the forces and pressures relate to one another and which 
stakeholders have an interest in or are affected by the specific pressures. 
 
4.3.1 Driving and restraining forces and pressures and associated stakeholders 
The driving pressures related to each driving force emerge in the interviews as expressions of the 
interests of different stakeholders such as companies, environmentalists, citizens, or authorities. 
Therefore, the terms interest and pressure are used as synonyms in this section. The driving 
pressures that appeared in the interviews are: environmental concerns, market economy, 
technological advance, urban planning, politics and policy, health, and sociocultural habits. Table 
2 summarizes the driving forces, associated driving pressures, and stakeholders who exert or 
have an interest in the associated pressure.  
 
  22 
Table 2: Driving forces, pressures, and key stakeholders. 
Driving 
Force 




CAVs expected to drive smoother and slower, using less fuel Car User, politician  
Car sharing would make CAVs more acceptable for environmentally-sensitive people Generic citizen 
People selling their cars and using shared CAVs Car user 
Market 
Economy 
Economic interest of car producers  Car producer 
Interest from Mobility-as-a-service providers e.g. car sharing companies,  Uber... (saving 
money by not paying drivers) 
MaaS provider 
Promotion and marketing shaping idealized, futuristic imagery of CAVs Car producer 
Cheap land away from city centre can become more accessible with CAVs (attractive for 
land owners and developers) 




Expected efficiency advantages with self-driving and self-parking technology  Car producer, land 
developer? 
Expectation of improved safety with CAVs Car user 
IT industry interested in partnership with car industry IT industry, car 
industry 
New technologies' (such as CAVs) usefulness taken for granted IT industry, car 
industry, car user 
Electrification of cars helps CAV promotion (as it provides multiple benefits for CAVs 
such as energy efficiency, money saving, less noise) 
Car producer, 
transport provider, car 
user 
Urban Planning 
Mobility consultants supporting local authorities shape visions for the mobility of the 
future 
Mobility consultants 
Need for improved mobility in rural areas (public transport not currently economically 
efficient) 
Urban planners 
Pilot studies are being conducted which anticipate CAVs introduction Multi-stakeholder 
Politics and 
Policy 
Politicians need to understand the implications of CAVs in cities Politicians 
Government economically dependent on (or, at least, tightly intertwined with) car 
industry 
Politicians 
Authorities with a history of continued investments in upgrading infrastructure can be 
more responsive when adapting to CAVs 
Politicians 
Health 
Covid-19 exacerbating need for flexible transport Generic citizen 




People using taxis and public transit are prepared for CAVs, especially shared CAVs Generic citizen 
Demand for productive use of time (work or recreation) while driving Car user 
Some urban dwellers prefer not to own cars (and instead demand shared CAVs) Generic citizen 
People interested in cars and new technologies in general can be interested in CAVs Generic citizen 
People who cannot drive (e.g. elderly, disabled…) have more opportunities with CAVs Generic citizen 
Ongoing work on legislation and regulations as preparatory work for CAVs Multi-stakeholder 
 
The restraining forces appearing in the interviews are: technological advance, environmental 
concerns, sociocultural habits, health, urban planning, market economy, and politics and policy. 
The restraining pressures are also connected to a set of stakeholders and pose a series of 
challenges to the development and subsequent introduction of CAVs in cities. Table 3 
summarizes the restraining forces, associated restraining pressures, and associated stakeholders. 
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Table 3: Restraining forces, pressures, and stakeholders. 
Restraining 
Force 




New technologies need to be mature and safe before being introduced to users (e.g. safety 
concerns from fatal CAV accidents). 
Car producer, car user, 
IT industry 
Fear of CAV technology being hacked Car user 
Fear that cities become built around CAVs, rather than creating a liveable city and adapting 




The sustainability agenda of local authorities can go against the introduction of CAVs, as 
their environmental impact is unclear 
Politicians and urban 
planners 
More cars means increased energy demand Car producer and car 
user 
If CAVs are electric: Environmental movement concerned that increased electricity supply  
will come from fossil fuels 
Generic citizen 
If CAVs are not electric: both air quality norms and climate policy could restrict the increase 
of CAVs based internal combustion engine vehicles 
Generic citizen 





Conspiracy theories and misinformation about new technologies Generic citizen 
The group of people who do not want to give up control of their vehicle Car user 
People who do not like cars Generic citizen 
Elderly people who are sceptical of new technology Elder people 
Cyclists are particularly sceptical about CAVs, in terms of safety and access to urban space Cyclist 
Health Concern that CAVs may increase congestion Generic citizen, urban 
planner 
Covid-19 pandemic and fear of shared vehicles Generic citizen 
Urban Planning 
Walking, biking and public transit as planning priority, not CAVs Urban planners 
In urban development policies the shared use of cars is deemed as more important than the 
self-driving aspect 
Urban planners and 
politicians 
Streets are not currently designed for CAVs Urban planners 
Market Economy 




Dual infrastructure (for CAVs and conventional vehicles) is expensive Politicians and urban 
planners 
Risk of investing in a technology that fails on the market (e.g. if users don't purchase CAVs 




Current international and national laws and regulations are not suitable for CAVs Politicians 
Lack of political consensus on visions for the future in cities Politicians 
Lack of knowledge and agreement about strategies from local authorities Politicians 
The ethical question of who has priority when there is a risk for collision between a 
pedestrian and a CAV 
Generic Citizen 
 
4.3.2 Survey results: Selected force field map 
The survey results show the strength that respondents assigned to each driving or restraining 
pressure—on a scale of weak (1), medium (2), or strong (3)—in terms of the effect of the 
pressure on the introduction of CAVs in cities. To analyse and present this data we first took the 
median strength of each pressure and then removed all pressures that had a median of 2. The 
rationale for this step is that all pressures with a median of 2 are not interesting because they are 
not salient in terms of being strong or weak. They are understood as relevant, but do not stand 
out in any way. 
 
The remaining pressures are salient, i.e., they are identified as stronger or weaker by survey 
respondents. Figure 7 shows the median and standard deviation for each of these pressures. 
Some of these results are unsurprising, for example the driving pressure with the highest median 
value is “Interest from mobility-as-a-service companies”; these companies could save money by 
not having to pay drivers, while “Safety concerns relating to fatal accidents” is one of the 
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restraining pressures with the lowest median value (i.e., a median of -3). Both concepts have 
been discussed at length in the media and academic literature, so it makes sense that respondents 
would identify these as important in terms of CAV introduction. 
 
Taking into account the reasoning behind the pressures (i.e., the interview context and 
background that explains the pressure) reveals a potentially interesting relationship. That CAVs 
could use less fuel by driving smoother and slower is identified as a weak driving pressure, 
meaning a pressure that is not perceived by respondents as having a strong effect on CAV 
introduction (see Figure 6: median = 1, s.d. = 0.79). By contrast, the potential for increased 
energy demand (median = -3, s.d. = 0.68) is seen as a strong restraining pressure. This makes 
sense from an engineering perspective since CAVs are expected to reduce specific energy 
consumption (Wh/km) since they may drive smoother and interact in a more efficient way with 
other vehicles and with infrastructure but could increase the demand for car mobility (Taiebat et 
al., 2019), as is also discussed in this thesis and in Paper 1. Hence, one could argue that most 
respondents do not see CAVs as a way of reducing emissions. Our interpretation of this is that 
the respondents believe that the demand impacts override the potential impacts of increasing the 
energy efficiency of the individual vehicle or vehicle system. 
 
These survey results should be viewed as complementary to the interview data. Figure 6 gives an 
idea of how the different pressures brought up in the interviews are perceived at a more general 
level. These results are not meant as standalone quantitative evidence of the importance and 
variance of pressures.  
 
Figure 6: Selected force field map, showing all survey results for all pressures that did not have a median value of 2. 
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4.4 Conclusions 
In Paper 2, we use a composite analytical framework of the DPS elements of DPSIR and force 
field analysis to analyse interview and survey data in order to identify both the relevant drivers 
and pressures relating to the introduction of CAVs in cities and the stakeholders who exert, or 
have an interest in, those drivers and pressures. Our results show that: 
 
• CAVs are not seen as unconditionally positive; instead, many stakeholders believe CAVs 
need to be connected to mobility planning and public transport strategies. 
 
• The societal economic dependence on the car industry, related to the Swedish context 
and particularly evident in Gothenburg, is an important driving pressure identified in the 
interviews. Dominance on the part of one actor, such as the car industry, can lead to one-sided 
development, which is why frameworks that reconcile private technology development and 
public-led development of city planning are important. 
 
• Important stakeholders in terms of the Gothenburg context, but also internationally, include 
pilot projects and consulting firms that promote the introduction of CAVs. Politicians, mobility 
consultants, and urban planners emerge from the interviews as very active parts of an ecosystem 
of funding and expertise created around these projects. 
 
• Scepticism toward new technology is certainly not a new phenomenon, but in this case 
the convergence of different stakeholders is potentially unique. Elderly people, cyclists, 
people who are concerned because of conspiracy beliefs related to new technology, and 
those who are concerned about environmental effects form quite a broad range, 
encompassing both technology sceptics and optimists as defined by Neilsen and 
Haustein (2018). 
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Chapter 5  
Contributions to science and policy 
Academic research on the introduction and effects of CAVs has become a mainstream subfield 
of study, especially within technical and engineering fields (Milakis et al., 2020). More and more 
research is beginning to happen in relation to policy instruments for CAVs (Cohen & Cavoli, 
2019; Docherty et al., 2018; Pernestål et al., 2020) and on less easily quantifiable effects that the 
technology could have on society. Thus far, much policy research is informed by technical, 
quantitative studies that simulate patterns of adoption or use (McLeod et al., 2020). This 
relationship between qualitative and quantitative is important and useful, because hard numbers 
are necessary in order to understand the direction and magnitude of the impacts of CAV 
technology before trying to create appropriate regulation. 
 
Paper 1 provides a relatively simple model that shows the potential effects of changes in 
technology cost and changes in how people use their time in passenger cars, and also shows how 
and why these two variables are considered so important when modelling CAVs. In terms of 
contributions to theoretical academic literature, this method of decomposing the components of 
a system in order to better understand them is related to what was done with IPAT, the Kaya 
Identity, and ASIF. More specifically, this work adds to existing analytical research by taking the 
studies by Wadud et al. (2016), Wadud (2017), and Taiebat et al. (2019) one step further and  
integrating an investment model and a travel demand model as well as considering the 
heterogeneity with respect to income classes and the option to work remotely in the vehicle. 
 
This paper is reductionist in the sense that it removes some of the complexities involved by 
focussing on just a few key variables. This kind of inductive research is arguably important in the 
early phase of the transition to CAVs (or the early stages of any sociotechnical transition) 
because we need to grasp a range of plausible outcomes of consequences of CAVs at this point, 
before a single outcome is “locked in” (Arthur, 1989, p. 117). Despite the push for new policy to 
meet the speed at which the technology is being developed, the field of user opinions and 
perspectives in relation to CAVs is very new. Exploring how wide its boundaries are is 
important, so as not to miss any potential implications. Essentially, this is the opposite of the 
movement in the 1950s and 60s in Sweden that Lundin identified. Rather than assuming that 
there is only one way forward for the development and societal introduction of this type of 
technology, this composite analysis framework allows us to explore multiple alternatives. 
 
One of the final take-away messages from Paper 1 is that more research into the studied 
variables as well as others that could have an effect on induced travel demand resulting from 
CAV adoption is important. Paper 2 focusses on a broader set of variables, but these are 
identified rather than quantified. Using two completely different methods for the first two 
articles of my doctoral studies was not by any means a simple or easy process, but doing so 
illuminated the strengths and weaknesses of each method and clarified the circumstances under 
which each is useful. 
 
Paper 1 uses current travel data, combined with assumptions about use of travel time and 
theoretical relationships when modelling how travellers would use CAVs. The pros of this 
approach are that it is based on empirical data, similar models have been used successfully in 
other country contexts, and the approach is relatively simple to present and communicate, thus 
making it a good option for future researchers to build on. The cons, however, are that many 
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assumptions have to be made and the relationships used are heavily simplified. Going back to 
Lundin’s criticism of the “car society”, these assumptions can lead to the same foregone 
conclusion that Lundin cautions us of in his thesis: If it has already been decided that the 
technology will be useful for everyone in one specific format (i.e., the privately owned passenger 
car), then other plausible future scenarios are left out of the equation, and this will cause 
problems later on when the one decided-upon scenario does not work for all of society. 
 
Paper 2, on the other hand, explores what other actors perceive as critical for the introduction of 
CAVs in cities, and the insights obtained could be used as a starting point for developing a 
plethora of scenarios. The paper contributes to and moves beyond the analysis about the 
governance of CAVs in cities (Cohen & Cavoli, 2019; Freemark et al, 2019; Gavanas, 2019; 
Hess, 2020; Hopkins & Schwanen, 2018; Legacy et al., 2019) by identifying salient drivers and 
pressures regarding the introduction of CAVs in cities, as well as the stakeholders who exert or 
have an interest in the pressures.  
 
The pros of the combined DPSIR and force field analysis framework being used to analyse 
interview and survey data are that diverse perspectives can be analysed and commonly held 
beliefs about CAV adoption can be challenged. This method allows for the identification of 
drivers and pressures that could potentially be applied in future work on the introduction of 
CAVs in cities, and due to the rich nature of the data we collected there are opportunities for the 
work to be applied to many different contexts, both in terms of geographical size and location. 
The con with this type of research, however, is that as a whole it is very difficult to apply to any 
one location. Even for the city of Gothenburg, the data that is collected comes from such 
diverging sources that it would be difficult to create one single scenario (e.g., to be used in a city 
transportation policy strategy) that fits all the identified drivers and pressures. This is not 
necessarily an insurmountable issue, as it is not the goal of this research to create one “solution”, 
but it does mean that more knowledge in regard to context and purpose is necessary in order to 
apply this work elsewhere, or to build upon it. 
 
An understanding of research methods is crucial for continued research on the same or related 
topics, in order to build on previous results. For example, if someone wanted to use the results 
of Paper 2 to inform a quantitative modelling study on the effects of CAV in a city, it would be 
important for that researcher to understand DPSIR and force field analysis, in order to be able to 
accurately apply the results of a study using those methodologies. This type of understanding 
relies on the clear communication of ideas, concepts and theories between academic or 
professional fields. It is particularly interesting in regard to the introduction of CAV technology 
and the growing field of research into its sociotechnical implications (of which potential GHG 
emissions from CAVs are a part), because this field encompasses researchers from many 
different disciplines, including but not limited to engineering, sociology, physics, and political 
science. In Section 2.3, I described how the qualitative results of Paper 2 could inform the 
quantitative components of the ASIF formula, which is one example of how mixed methods can 
provide a broader understanding of a situation. Communication and understanding between 
academic fields is important for thorough research on the sociotechnical implications of CAVs, 
because it produces the possibility for different methods to be combined and tested, thereby 
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Chapter 6  
Future Work 
Following the DPS(IR) analysis done in Paper 2, my next research will use the same interview 
data to identify the IR components, i.e., the impacts and responses, related to the state of CAVs 
in cities. In a separate study, this could be applied to the demand model used in Paper 1, in order 
to expand the model and take more diverse aspects into account and analyse policies to avoid 
potential negative consequences of CAVs. 
 
Another fascinating and important direction that builds on existing research and is closely tied to 
potential emissions as analysed by ASIF or other decomposition tools would be to explore 
scenarios that are able to show the interaction dynamics of increased transportation accessibility 
from CAVs, VKT, and shared mobility. This could be done by analysing how different use cases 
for CAVs (e.g., car sharing privately or publicly, transporting children to activities, transporting 
people who cannot drive themselves) contribute to increased system energy efficiency in 
transportation, or how the same use cases contribute to increased car reliance with an increase in 
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In a high-income country like Sweden, the (Value of Travel Time) VoTT constitutes a large 
portion Generalised Travel Cost (GTC). If the cost of travel decreases (ceteris paribus), the demand 
for travel will likely increase. Our model analyses this relationship in two steps. The first step 
calculates the GTC of an income group using a conventional vehicle, and the GTC for the same 
group using a Connected and Autonomous Vehicle (CAV). If the GTC for the CAV is lower, we 
assume the group would adopt a CAV. The second step calculates how much those who 
purchase CAVs will change their travel distance. Our results show that when all income groups 
see the same CAV technology cost and the same relative change in VoTT, the higher income 
groups will have a larger (absolute) economic incentive to adopt a CAV. Given that a CAV is 
adopted, the travel distance will see a larger change in relation to larger incomes.  However, if the 
impact of VoTT is large enough or the technology cost low enough it will be beneficial for all 
income groups to adopt a CAV and consequently affecting the traveling distance for all groups. 
Further, some studies indicate that the relative impact on VoTT is larger for commuting trips and 
for people who can work in the car. Taking this into account shows that a potential effect on 
CAV adoption. Thus, it is important in future scenario analysis to consider other non-income 
factors affecting VoTT, and subsequently CAV adoption. 
 
Key Words: CAV, VoTT, value of travel time, generalised travel costs, travel 




Connected and autonomous vehicles1 (CAVs) are a key trend in the transport sector today. CAVs 
are expected to affect travel behaviour significantly as the need for an able driver may disappear, 
freeing up travellers to perform different activities in the vehicle (Fosgerau, 2019). Today, some 
vehicles already have technology that makes it possible for the driver to enter some version of 
 
1 “Connected and Autonomous Vehicle” refers to a level 4 vehicle as described by the SAE guidelines: 
https://www.sae.org/standards/content/j3016_201806/. For the purposes of this study, the vehicle is assumed to 
have a steering wheel and pedals, but they are only used under some conditions. We assume that these vehicles 




autopilot mode, thus relieving the driver from the stress of navigating congested traffic (as one 
example) (Bansal & Kockelman, 2017). The Swedish government has recognized the large impact 
that CAVs could have on the transportation system, on individual travellers, and on urban 
infrastructure, and is in the process of researching appropriate policies to govern these potential 
changes (Hammes, 2019). 
 
CAVs could radically change the way that we spend our travel time, potentially leading to 
changes in travel demand. If the car can drive reliably by itself under most conditions, the driver 
will theoretically be able to do much more than simply minimizing the stress associated with 
irritating driving tasks. They will be able to make use of their time in the vehicle by doing work-
related tasks on a laptop or other connected device, watching television, or even sleeping (Pudāne 
et al., 2018; Wadud & Huda, 2019). This will likely affect the way that the time spent travelling in 
vehicles is valued, i.e. the Value of Travel Time (VoTT) (Becker, 1965; De Serpa, 1971). In fact, a 
recent International Transport Forum (ITF) report suggested that lower VoTT could be used for 
transport appraisal if “the mode of transport and its supporting environment enable a range of 
activities (work or leisure) to be carried out while travelling” (2019, p. 16). 
 
 In a high-income country such as Sweden, the VoTT typically makes up a large portion of a 
person’s Generalised Travel Cost (GTC) (Small & Verhoef, 2007). Following the general logic of 
price responsive demand, if the cost of travel decreases (ceterus paribus), then the demand for 
travel will likely increase. Thus, if the VoTT decreases, causing the GTC to decrease, the demand 
for travel will increase.  
 
The big question is by how much VoTT may drop, and to what extent this will affect the travel 
demand. Wadud et al. (2016) did an analysis based on potential relative reduction in VoTT for 
US drivers and an assumption about GTC elasticities. Their estimated changes in travel demand 
ranged from a 4% increase with low levels of automation, to a 60% increase with CAV adoption. 
Taiebat et al. (2019) used an approach based on demand elasticity estimates and empirically based 
demand function from the US National Household Travel Survey (NHTS). They estimated a 
2%-47% increase in travel demand, based on assumptions on how CAVs would affect fuel 
economy and the VoTT (Taiebat et al., 2019).  
 
These studies build on the assumptions that CAVs will be adopted by the whole population. 
However, Wadud (Wadud, 2017) analysed under which conditions (costs and income level) 
CAVs would pass a break-even Net Present Value calculation and finds that this depends 
strongly on income level since the VoTT is strongly dependent on income. 
 
In some studies that look at future scenarios, VoTT is examined as one part of a larger range of 
factors that will change because of CAVs, causing ripple effects through society (Compostella et 
al., 2020; Milakis et al., 2017).  This type of analysis provided inspiration for our study, but we 
apply these ideas to the Swedish situation; first focussing on conditions for CAV adoption, and 
then on the first-order effect (as referred to by Milakis et al.) of changes in travel demand. The 
research questions that we seek to answer are: 
 
1. What is the relationship between income, value of travel time and break-even costs for 
CAV adoption? 
2. How could CAV adoption have an impact on travel distance for individuals in Sweden, 




This paper develops and applies an economic travel demand model in order to fulfill the two 
research questions stated above. Methodologically, it follows a two-step process and is built upon 
4 central concepts: (1) generalised cost of traveling (GTC) , (2) Value of travel time (VoTT), (3) 
break even cost calculations and (4) demand functions. 
 
Firstly, the model calculates the GTC of an income group when travelling with a conventional 
vehicle, and the GTC for the same group travelling with a CAV. If the GTC for the CAV is 
lower, it is assumed that the people in that income group would purchase the CAV. When 
calculating GTC we used similar methods to those in (Wadud, 2017), and many numerical 
assumptions are based on the Swedish Transport Authority’s approach on calculating GTC in 
their modelling (Trafikverket, 2018c).  
 
Secondly, the model calculates how much those who adopt a CAV according to the approach in 
step will change their travel distance. For this we used travel demand calculations similar to those 
used by Wadud (2017) and Taiebat et al. (2019).  
 
2.1 Generalised travel costs 
The Generalized Travel Cost (GTC) captures the full levelized cost of traveling per unit distance, 











The vehicle related parts of GTC can be divided in the fixed cost, being vehicle depreciation with 
respect to calendar age, and variable cost, being fuel cost and vehicle depreciation with respect to 
mileage. The vehicle depreciation with respect to mileage is 1/3 of the annual depreciation for an 
average car (Trafikverket, 2018a). In addition to vehicle related parameters VoTT is a critical part 
of GTC (see section 2.2) 
 
While the use of GTC for estimating changes in travel behaviour has been criticized by some 
(Wardman & Toner, 2018), it is justified by that it is used in many traffic simulation models such 
as many models used by national transport authorities such (Ortúzar & Willumsen, 2011; 
Trafikverket, 2018a; UK Department for Transport, 2019). There are two key aspects GTC that 
will change because of CAVs: the VoTT and the capital cost of the vehicle. The extra capital cost 
is likely to be associated with the sensors (lidars, radars, cameras etc.) and the processing power 
needed for automated driving.  
 
2.2 VoTT: background and empirical assumptions 
The value of travel time (VoTT) can be described as how much the time that a person spends 
travelling is worth, usually given in monetary units per unit time. VoTT is an important part of 
economic appraisal of transportation infrastructure projects, and other forms of government 
spending affecting people’s use of time (Ortúzar & Willumsen, 2011). The concept of value of 
Generalized Travel Costs 
Assumed 2050 Values 
Fuel cost  0,78 SEK/km 
Maintenance cost  0,3 SEK/km 
Capital depreciation-fixed 1,37 SEK/km 
Capital depreciation-variable 0,68 SEK/km 
Table 1: Components of GTC, for a driver of a non-CAV in 2050. 
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time dates back to Becker who suggested that a person’s opportunity cost of time was equal to 
their wage rate  (Becker, 1965). The value of time concept was later reformulated and developed 
by Johnson (1966), Oort (1969) and De Serpa (1971). In the supplementary material (SM 1) we 
present a theoretical model of the VoTT and how is may be affected by CAVs based primarily on 
the reasoning by Oort (1969).   
 
Hence, based on the analysis in SM 1 and related analysis in Fosgerau (2019); Correia et al. (2019) 
and (Pudāne & Correia, 2020), the VoTT can be seen as the marginal value of leisure time plus 
the intrinsic cost of spending time in the vehicle where the marginal value of leisure is equal to 
the wage rate minus the disutility of working. Hence, the VoTT is the sum of the value of giving 
up a leisure activity (or work) that could have been done otherwise (i.e. the opportunity cost of 
time) and the value of spending time in the vehicle. The sum of these could be reduced by 
making it possible to do meaningful activities in the car and/or by increasing the comfort of the 
car. Both these terms are likely to be affected by autonomy. 
 
Furthermore, the methods for measuring VoTT continue to evolve and are not as 
straightforward as indicated by the theoretical model in SM1.  More qualitative factors are being 
taken into account, moving away from Becker’s wage-based estimations (Jain & Lyons, 2008). 
The value of different trip purposes, for example shopping, commuting, driving children to 
various activities, is now considered to be important for determining an accurate valuation 
(Correia et al., 2019), as well as the level of comfort that the person experiences during travel 
(Kouwenhoven & de Jong, 2018). 
 
An exact value of VoTT is of course hard to pin down and differs both in terms of travel 
situation and comfort, but also in terms of the statistical approach used to estimate the number 
(Wardman et al, 2016). For example, for commuting trips Börjesson & Eliasson (2012) estimated 
a value of 9.8 €/hr in Sweden, Correia et al 7.47 €/hr in Netherlands and Wardman et al (2016) 
7.12 €/hr. Furthermore, the value of the VoTT can both be estimated from stated preference 
surveys as well as revealed preference studies. Wardman et al. show in their 2016 meta-analysis of 
VoTT studies in Europe that there are differences between revealed and stated preferences for 
VoTT, and that revealed preferences tend to be somewhat higher. 
 
The most recent official evaluation on Swedish VoTT was compiled in 2010 (WSP, 2010). A 
series of stated preference surveys between 2007-2009 were used to determined values of travel 
time for different segments of the Swedish population, and how those values differed according 
to trip purpose and safety levels of the traffic environment. 
 
The use of VoTT in transportation infrastructure appraisal is often disaggregated for different 
modes and other circumstances, but for distributional reasons not disaggregated with respect to 
income for different individuals (Börjesson & Eliasson, 2014, 2019). However, when using VoTT 
to “simulate” and analyse consumer adoption and associated travel impact of technologies it 
makes sense to link VoTT to income, since this better represents behaviour. 
 
Wadud et al (2017) and Taiebat et al (2019) in the context of CAVs differentiate VoTT according 
to income level using a VoTT income elasticity of unity. The elasticity of VoTT with respect to 
income is uncertain, but there exist some empirical support that it is around unity or somewhat 
less (Mackie et al., 2001; Wardman et al., 2016). Many transport authorities do for example 
assume an income elasticity of unity for accounting for income growth when analysing projects 
impacting traveling over several years (Trafikverket, 2018; UK Department for Transport, 2019).  
Further, Börjesson & Eliasson, (2014) analysed two Swedish VoTT studies that were performed 
13 years apart and found that income elasticity with respect to VoTT increases with income, 
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being close to zero when below the median income and unity or higher above the median 
income. Thus, we adjust VoTT to reflect different income quintiles of that society, using the 
Swedish Transportation Authority’s VoTT for the median income quintile and an VoTT income 
elasticity of unity.  
 
For calibrating the consumer group characteristics we use the most recent version of Swedish 
travel survey, which stretches over the period 2011-2016. We used the finest grained self-
reported data on mode of transportation and trip distances (i.e. trip elements) together with 
information on driver income, employment, trip purpose and whether or not the driver was able 
to work from distance. Using all these variables we were able to identify the type of travellers and 
travel patterns that we wanted to explicitly consider. 
 
Using the income data from all the respondents who drive a car on the measurement day, have 
an employment and non-zero income, we disaggregated them into five income quintiles and 
divided each quintile into one group who could work from distance and one who could not work 
from distance (being a proxy for if the respondent could potentially work in the car or not). The 
reported income in the national travel survey was adjusted for inflation using the consumer price 
index. Within each quintile we calculated the average travelling distances of car drivers for 
commuting and other purposes, for both long (>100 km) and short distance (≤100 km) trips, as 
shown in Table 2. We then applied VoTTs from the Swedish Transportation Authority, which 
we assumed was representative for an average driver in 2016, to the respective trips and adjusted 
those VoTTs in relation to the calculated income in each of our five income quintiles together 
with the assumption that average income in each quintile grows with 1.5% per year up to 2050 
(see Table 3). Hence, our calculation intends to represent a scenario around 2050 the annual 




























210 608  
Yes  17 22 0 11 11 50 
1 No 20 18 0 7 7 45 
 
299 506  
Yes  22 15 3 9 12 49 
2 No 22 17 1 8 9 49 
 
349 825  
Yes  22 16 3 14 17 55 
3 No 23 19 1 10 11 52 
 
415 471  
Yes  25 20 1 14 16 61 
4 No 24 18 4 13 17 59 
  
642 387  
Yes  24 21 5 17 21 66 
5 No 20 21 3 18 22 62 















1 97 66 121 
2 138 93 172 
3 161 109 200 
4 191 129 238 
5 295 200 368 
Table 3: Estimated VoTT in 2050. 
 
When analyzing the impact that CAVs may have on VoTT one needs to consider both the reason 
for the impact, and its magnitude. The reason for the impact depends on what the traveller is able 
to do in the vehicle, and the magnitude depends on utility they gain from that activity. It is 
important to remember here that there are no revealed preference studies available yet for VoTT 
in CAVs, but there is a wealth of research based on different proxies (Bansal & Kockelman, 
2017; Gao et al., 2019; Harb et al., 2018; Pudāne et al., 2019; Wadud & Huda, 2019; Wardman et 
al., 2019; Yap et al., 2016).   
 
They key reason for a reduction in VoTT is that the former driver is now enabled to use the time 
in the vehicle for something useful. Some authors suggest that changes in so-called subjective 
well-being may cause notable changes in VoTT (Singleton, 2019), as travellers gain utility from 
relaxing or enjoying passing scenery.  Others suggest that the changes will come from being able 
to multitask in the vehicle (Malokin et al., 2019). This is of course dependent on the traveller 
using their travel time for work, which might not always be the case (Cyganski et al., 2015; 
Wadud & Huda, 2019).  
 
The size of impact on VoTT is even more difficult to approximate since there exist no actual on-
road experience of operating a CAV in an everyday situation and it is difficult to generalise 
insights from stated preference studies regarding a yet-to-be experienced technology. However, 
without considering CAVs explicitly, VoTT could be reduced 20-25% if the traveller was able to 
put their time to worthwhile use (ITF, 2019). Many articles present different assumptions of 
VoTT reduction, but because the size of the reduction depends largely on the scenario context, 
the assumptions range from 100% - 0% reductions (Singleton, 2019). There are a very limited 
number of studies that estimate a potential reduction in VoTT based on stated preferences, such 
as Correia et al. (2019) who found that if the interior of a CAV was designed as an office, the 
VoTT was lower than that of a conventional vehicle with a normal interior, but if the interior of 
the CAV was designed for leisure activities the VoTT did not decrease. In addition, Gao et al. 
(2019) suggest a 13-45% reduction during commuting, according to results from a stated 
preference survey on ride hailing services. In the scenarios presented later in the article we have 
assumed that there are differences between VoTT for commuting and VoTT for other activities. 
The reduction in VoTT during commuting is assumed to be larger in some of the scenarios, 
which then is reflected in the modelled changes in GTC and travel distances. 
 
2.3 Criteria for CAV adoption: Break even calculations 
We use a type of Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) to determine whether or not each income group 
would adopt a CAV. We use CBA in the sense that the criteria of adopting a CAV is based on 
the individual economic costs and benefits of owning a CAV, according to income, usefulness of 
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travel time, and extra cost of CAV technology. Hence, the GTC of normal is assessed relative to 
that of a CAV when including both the fixed and variable parts of the GTC. We assume that the 
driver/owner would purchase a CAV if the levelized GTC are lower than the corresponding 
estimate for a conventional car. However, note that we only consider personal costs and benefits 
for the driver of the vehicle. We do not consider any other potential users of the car, nor do we 
consider external costs such as congestion and emissions. The GTC for a normal car is based on 
Trafikverket (2018) and Trafikverket’s Analytical Methods and Socioeconomic Calculations 
(ASEK) Recommendations (Bångman, 2016). It is assumed that every traveller has the same 
costs in terms of vehicle price, maintenance, and fuel.  
 
Error! Reference source not found. Critical for the adoption of CAVs are the technology 
costs. There is a large uncertainty around what the necessary CAV technology actually costs 
today and how that cost will develop over the coming decades. For example the CEO of Volvo 
Cars has said that level 4 technology would add $ 10 000 to the vehicle cost in 2021 (Edelstein, 
2017; Lesage, 2016). Further, the price of the “self driving capability” newly ordered Teslas as of 
February 2020 is $7 000, and while technically these vehicles are level 2, there is official Tesla 
rhetoric that the system has a hardware capability of level 4 (Hawkins, 2019). However, it is 
difficult to know how accurate these statements and prices are for the actual costs, much 
information around technology costs are safeguarded by most automobile manufacturers. There 
are also estimates of the additional costs for CAV technology in the academic literature (see 
Table 4). Note that the costs for CAV technology presented in Table 4 is considered to be in 
addition to the price of a conventional vehicle. In our scenarios presented below we will assume a 
range between 30 000 and 100 000 SEK in the year 2050. 
 
Study Author Low cost Medium cost High cost Year 
Bansal & Kockelman, 2017 -- 80 600 SEK -- 2045 
Wadud, 2017 112 500 
SEK 
136 400 SEK 179 400 
SEK 
2020 
Lavasani et al., 2016 28 000 SEK 50 000 SEK 94 000 SEK 2025 
Compostella et al., 2020 30 500 SEK 95 000 SEK 280 000 
SEK 
2030-2035 
Table 4: Costs of CAV Technology in different academic studies. 
 
2.4 Elasticities and induced travel demand 
Cheaper travel tends to induce more travel. As for all normal consumer goods the demand for 
the good (i.e. travel) tend to increase if the price (generalized cost of travel) drops. This is clear 
from for example, (1) the rebound effect,  where increased fuel efficiency tends to lead to a lower 
marginal cost of traveling, which in turn leads to increased mileage (Small & van Dender, 2007), 
and by (2) the induced traveling effect, where improved “speed” from going to A to B by, for 
example new highway capacity and/or reduced congestion, tends to generate more travel 
(Goodwin, 1996). In the latter example the general cost of traveling is reduced due to reduced 
VoTT per km since the speed is higher. Hence, the rebound effects of the induced travelling 
phenomena are interlinked aspects of impacts on the general cost of traveling (Hymel et al., 2010; 
Small & Van Dender, 2007). 
 
The theoretical and empirical findings for rebound effect and induced travel demand (through 
infrastructure and congestion mitigation projects) clearly indicate that a reduced GTC can have 
an impact on travel demand. For example, studies point towards that the rebound effect declines 
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with income (Greene, 2012; Small & Van Dender, 2007). This is surely what one should expect 
given a constant demand elasticity with respect to GTC since the share of fuel cost in the GTC 
declines as VoTT increases with income (Small & Van Dender, 2007; Greene, 2012).  
 
Regarding the rebound effect there are a plethora of studies that try to empirically estimate the 
size of the rebound effect. The empirical findings suggest a long-run rebound effect of around 
0.1-0.3, (an elasticity of travel distance with respect to fuel cost) meaning that 10% increase in 
fuel efficiency generates a 1-3% increase in annual vehicle mileage (Dimitropoulos et al, 2018; 
Andersson et al, 2019). Regarding the long-run induced travel demand elasticity other studies 
have estimated it to be in the order of -0.5 to -1 (an elasticity of travel distance with respect to 
travel time), in the sense that a 10% reduction in travel time tend to induce 5-10% increase in 
travel volume (Andersson & Smidfelt Rosqvist, 2011; De Jong & Gunn, 2001; Goodwin, 1996).  
 
These two elasticities; elasticity of travel distance with respect to fuel cost and elasticity of travel 
distance with respect to travel time, are related and can be unified through the concept of 
elasticity of travel distance with respect to general cost of travel, see for example Goodwin et al. 
(1996) and our Section 2 in our Supplementary Materials where this is analysed in brief. The 
empirical evidence based on the rebound effect and the induced traveling points towards an 
elasticity with respect to variable GTC of about -1, but could be substantially smaller or larger. 
This is also roughly in line with the mid-assumption in Wadud et al. (2016).  
 
2.5 Additional assumptions 
In order to model the choices and behaviours of individual travellers, we needed to make some 
assumptions. Most of these assumptions relate to rational behaviour-based decision-making: we 
assume that the traveller considers only economic factors when choosing to adopt a CAV or not, 
and we assume that they are aware of the savings that could be made from a CAV in terms of 
reduced VoTT. Further, there could be many more factors that could sway the decision of the 
traveller towards adoption, such as social status or pressure (Rezvani et al., 2018) as well as safety 
aspects. There could also be factors that pushes the decisions in another direction, for example 
lack of trust in AV technology (Gao et al., 2019; Yap et al., 2016). 
 
When calculating the GTC of a CAV, we assumed there would be no changes in fuel, 
maintenance, or insurance cost as a result of potential increased efficiencies the car being fully 
autonomous and connected. This could underestimate the benefits associated with CAV 
adoption, thus potentially making our calculations slightly conservative. We made these 
assumptions because wanted to isolate the effect of VoTT and make our calculations as 
transparent as possible.  
 
2.6 Scenario parameters 
 We develop three scenarios called “Little”, “Medium” and “Large” aimed to cover three rather 
different cases on how CAV technology has developed over time in terms of cost and the impact 
the technology has on the VoTT. The numerical assumptions in the three scenarios we model are 
shown in Table 5. The “Little” scenario relates to a future scenario similar to that which was 
described in the 2019 ITF report (ITF, 2019), where automation does not have a large effect on 
individual commuting patterns (and other travel patterns). Following the findings of Correia et al. 
(2019) and Gao et al. (2019) we assume that time spent commuting will have a larger change in 
VoTT than time spent travelling for other reasons.  The “Large” scenario is closer to the patterns 
described by Harb et al. (2018), where the CAV technology largely impacts the utility leading to a 





Scenario Reduction in VoTT 
Other 
Reduction in VoTT 
Commuting 
Cost of CAV 
technology 
Small 15% 25% 100 000 SEK 
Medium 35% 35% 50 000 SEK 
Large 50% 60% 30 000 SEK 
Table 5: Scenario descriptions. 
 
3. Results 
In order to understand the results and the importance of VoTT, we first show the GTC broken 
down into components for different income groups and as well for how the GTC differs for 
those who are able to work remotely and those who are not, see Figure 1. In the higher income 
quintiles, VoTT makes up a larger percentage of the overall GTC per km than lower income 
quintiles, because the people in those quintiles have a higher income and consequently a higher 
VoTT (due to the assumption of a VoTT income elasticity of unity). Further, there are only very 
slight differences in GTC between those who are able to work remotely since there are no reason 
to expect that the VoTT or other components of the GTC would differ dependent if a person 
can work remotely or not. The small differences in GTC within an income quintile are a result of 
different travel distances as found in the RVU.  
 
 
Figure 1: Generalized Cost of Travel (GTC), measured per kilometre for a vehicle without CAV technology in 2050. The 
percentage shown in the light green sections is the percent of GTC that is represented by VoTT. ”Yes” and “No” refer to ability to 
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Generalised Travel Cost without CAV
VoTT per km Fuel Cost per km Maintenance Cost per km Vehicle Cost per km wo AV
10 
 
3.1 Changes in Generalized Travel Costs 
Figure 2 shows the change in capital cost, the change in VoTT, and the change in GTC (net of 
capital cost and VoTT change) per kilometer for each scenario, quintile and each case of ability to 
work remotely. All else the same the higher income quintiles have a stronger incentive to adopt 
CAVs, because adoption of a CAV would cause a larger absolute drop CAV in their VoTT as 
compared to the case for those with a smaller income s. This holds for all scenarios. It is clear 
that in both the “Medium” and “Large” it is beneficial for all average drivers in each income 
quintiles to adopt a CAV, it is only in the “Little” scenario where it differs between income 
groups and between groups who can and cannot work remotely. 
 
In scenario “Little” and “Large” those which are able to work from distance have larger impact 
on VoTT than those who could not work remotely. Consequently, people belonging to these 
groups have a stringer incentive to adopt a CAV than those who in the same income quintile 
who cannot work in the car. This is for example clear in Figure 2 and the “Little scenario” were 
we find a positive benefit-cost difference for the average person in income quintile 4 that can 
work remotely and a negative benefit-cost difference for the average person in income quintile 4 
that cannot work remotely. 
  
In the medium scenario, where we do not differentiate the VoTT reduction between those who 
can and cannot work in the car the change in GTC is slightly smaller for those who can work 
remotely (Figure 3). This is primarily because the average person this group drives fewer daily 
kilometres in total causing the capital investment to be levelized over fewer kilometers. Note 
though that also in other income quintiles there are cases those who cannot work remotely drive 
slightly more in one disaggregated category, but in these cases the average person in the same 
income quintile who can work from home has more the long-distance trips and by assumption 
VoTT is larger for long distance trips than short distance trips (see Table 2).  
 
 
Figure 2: Change GTC due to CAV in each scenario. The green bar shows the net reduction in VoTT per km due to operating a 
CAV as compared to a conventional car, the grey bar shows the increase in cost per km due to the CAV technology, while the 
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3.2 Changes in Travel Demand 
If the GTCCAV is lower than the GTCCONV for an average driver in each income and work 
category we assume that a CAV will be adopted for all drivers in that category. The subsequent 
step in the modeling is to estimate the increase in the travel demand for an average driver in each 
category. The extra cost of the CAV technology will have a relatively smaller effect on the 
variable GTC than the total GTC. Hence, the cost that affects the travel demand is based on 
variable part of the GTC, which includes VoTT, fuel and maintenance costs, and variable 
depreciation costs2.  Given a demand elasticity of -1 with respect to variable GTC we estimate 
the impact of CAVs on traveling distance.  
 
As expected, the changes in travel distance are most dramatic for the “Large” scenario (Figure 2), 
being a 61% increase overall for the assessed population.  The “Medium” scenario shows an 
increase in traveling of 32% and the small scenario has a relatively small increase 5%.  Further, 
looking into the different categories of drivers we see a heterogenous picture regarding impact on 
travel distance of CAVs. Generally, higher income groups show a larger change in travel distance 
irrespective of scenario. The reason is twofold. First, the higher income quintiles have a stronger 
incentive to adopt a CAV since they have a larger VoTT and for that reasons may have an 
incentive to a adopt a CAV even if the relative impact on VoTT is relatively small and the cost of 
technology is high. This is why we in the “Little” scenario only observe travel distance increases 
in the higher income groups.  Second, the relative share of VoTT in GTC is higher the larger the 
income is (Figure 1) and the estimated travel demand given that a CAV is adopted depends on 
the relative change in GTC.  
 
Given this heterogeneity it is interesting to observe that even with a relatively high price for CAV 
technology, and a small change in VoTT (as in the Little scenario), an average driver in the group 
consisting of those with the highest income and who can work remotely would increase their 
travel distance by as much as 17% which can be compared to 5% that is the average increase in 
distance for this scenario.  
 
Regarding the possibility to work in the car, we observe that the travel distance impact is larger 
for those who can work in the car compared to those who cannot (given that a CAV is adopted 
in the first place). This follows from the assumption that relative reduction in VoTT due to CAV 
use are largest for commuting trips where the operator of the vehicle can work in the car.   
 
 
2 We assume that 2/3 of the depreciation of capital costs are fixed, and 1/3 are variable, according to Trafikverket’s 
2018 ASEK calculations Kapital 13: Operativa trafikeringskostnader för persontrafik. Figure 2 shows the overall 





Figure 3: This shows the increase in travel distance for each group and scenario in blue. The first column on the left (‘Total’) shows 
the total daily increase in travel distance across all groups in each scenario in yellow. 
 
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis of travel distance elasticity with respect to travel cost 
We performed a sensitivity analysis on the travel distance Elasticity with respect to variable part 
of the GTC, to see how sensitive the changes in travel demand is due to different assumptions. 
Figure 4 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis with elasticity values of -0.5, -1 (baseline) and 
-1.5. The higher the elasticity, the larger the induced travel difference is between scenarios. This 
holds for all scenario and all income groups in cases where a CAV is adopted.  
 
 












Total Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
1 2 3 4 5
Little 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 0% 17% 12%
Medium 32% 21% 20% 28% 27% 32% 30% 35% 35% 42% 41%


























VCE 0,5 VCE  1
(baseline)
VCE 1,5
Little 2% 4,86% 7,13%
Medium 14,76% 31,79% 48,25%
























Sensitivity Analysis of Variable Cost Elasticity Today Including VoTT
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4. Discussion about model simplifications 
One weakness of the model approach is the assumption the capital cost of the vehicle and the 
CAV technology is the same irrespective if income group. In reality, it is likely that those with 
higher incomes would purchase more expensive vehicles (and the opposite for those with a low 
income) and thus vehicle capital cost per km would make up a larger (smaller) portion of the total 
GTC per km than what is estimated in Figure 1.  However, if the traveller has already purchased 
a more expensive ordinary vehicle, then the extra cost that will be associated with CAV 
technology (given that it is the same technology for all vehicles) will be smaller (larger) in 
proportion to the capital cost of the conventional car for high (low) income groups. If we did 
consider this in our modeling it would not affect the adoption criteria analysed in section 3.1 
since it compares the impact on VoTT with the cost of the CAVs technology, i.e. the same 
groups (i.e., income and eligibility to work remotely) would find it beneficial to adopt the CAV 
technology. However, given that there is a positive correlation both between income and the cost 
of car purchased and the income and VoTT, respectively, the impact of travel demand would be 
smaller (larger) than for the high (low) income groups than what is estimated in section 3.2 and 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to analyse the relationship between GTC, travel distance, possibility to 
work remotely and VoTT, with specific regard to plausible changes that could occur because of 
adoption of CAV technology. It was established in the data collection and the related analysis 
that those in the higher income quintiles, and those who are able to work remotely, tend to have 
longer travel distances as for now. Also, given typical findings people with a higher income tend 
to have a higher VoTT. 
 
As long as all income groups have the same change in technology price (i.e. the CAV technology 
cost) and relative change in VoTT, the higher income groups will in all cases we analysed have a 
larger (absolute) economic incentive to adopt a CAV. The key reason is that they have a higher 
VoTT, but also due to that their average daily driving distance is on average longer, which in turn 
causes the CAV technology cost to be levelized over a larger distance.  
 
For future research, it would be interesting to further study technology variations between 
income groups, variations in travel distance and technology within income groups, in order to 
better understand what other factors besides income can contribute to understanding for which 
groups it would be beneficial to adopt a private CAV.  
 
If it is beneficial for the specific group to adopt a CAV, it is likely to increase travel distance for 
that group. We see that CAVs could have a large impact in average travel distance across all 
income groups, but likely to have a larger impact on the travel distance for a high-income group 
due to a larger share of VoTT in their GTC. Thus, it would be interesting for future research to 
consider other scenarios where changes in VoTT differ within income groups in a more diverse 
aspect than the consideration if they can work in the car or not, or in relation to other factors. 
However, the statistical information on the behavioural related aspects of CAVs are still in its 
infancy.  
 
We already saw here how the ability to work from home, when used as a proxy for being able to 
work in a CAV, can have significant effects on CAV adoption and increased travel demand under 
certain conditions. The literature on the size of CAV-related reductions in VoTT for commuting 
and VoTT for other activities is still quite limited, and of course based on stated preferences, and 
so it is very difficult to know how well this reflects reality. But it is important to explore the 
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scenarios that could emerge if certain groups have the advantage of more “useful” time in CAVs, 
because this can demonstrate how relatively innocuous characteristics, such as being able to work 
from home, can lead to unexpectedly large increases in travel demand. It is also important to 
remember that our model is relatively simple. There are most likely many more such 
characteristics (such as household composition, geographic location, and local transportation 
infrastructure) that, when combined, could have even larger effects on travel demand and related 
environmental issues. 
 
Any prolonged increase in travel distance, such as that shown in our model, could eventually lead 
to serious effects on congestion, both tailpipe and particle emissions from vehicles, and overall 
energy needs of the transport sector. These results could be useful for policymakers when future 
scenarios involving CAVs are being considered, and also useful for future research on travel 
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S1. Theoretical exposition of how CAVs may affect the value of travel time 
In order to elucidate on how the value of time may be affected due to introduction of Connected 
and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) we present a simple theoretical model on the Value of Travel 
Time concept based on utility maximization with an income budget as well as time use budget. 
We resort to simplest model possible to capture to capture the key insights in how CAVs may 
affect the value of time. A similar exposition was presented in Pudane & Correia (2020), were our 
model is slightly simpler since we do not take into account that it takes time to consume 
purchased goods. Still the general insights are similar.  
 
S1.1 Normal vehicle 
We assume that all wage income, being the product of the wage rate (𝑤) and working time (𝑇𝑤) is 
spend on consumption (𝐶) and that the available time (𝜏) can either be spent on traveling (𝑇𝑡 ), 
working (𝑇𝑤) or as leisure (𝑇𝑙 ). 𝑇𝑡,𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the minimum amount of time needed for traveling. The 
constrained utility (𝑈) maximising problem can be stated as  
 
Max 
𝑈(𝐶, 𝑇𝑤 , 𝑇𝑡 , 𝑇𝑙 ) 
s.t  
𝑤 ∙ 𝑇𝑤 − 𝑋 = 0 
𝜏 − 𝑇𝑤 − 𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑙 = 0 
𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡,𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0 
 
 
 The Langrangian is 
 
ℒ = 𝑈(𝐶, 𝑇𝑤 , 𝑇𝑡 , 𝑇𝑙 ) + 𝜆 ∙ (𝑤 ∙ 𝑇𝑤 − 𝑋) + 𝜇 ∙ (𝜏 − 𝑇𝑤 − 𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑙 ) + 𝜅 ∙ (𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡,𝑚𝑖𝑛 ) 
 
were 𝜆, 𝜇 and 𝜅 associated with each respective constraint. 
 




























Which says that the marginal utility of leisure is equal the marginal utility of work (likely negative) 
+ marginal utility of money multiplied with the wage rate.  
 
𝜅 is the shadow value of the travel time constraint, i.e. how much would the utility change if the 
constraint on traveling time change by one unit. Hence, 𝜅/
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶































The value of time is the wage rate, plus the money value of the marginal utility of spending time 
working (likely a negative number) minus the marginal utility of spending time in the vehicle 
(likely a negative number). Alternatively, the VoTT can also be interpreted as the marginal money 
value of leisure time minus the marginal money value of spending time in the vehicle.  
 
S1.2 CAV 
For CAVs the constrained utility maximising problem is reformulated as the follow  
 
Max 
𝑈(𝐶, 𝑇𝑤+𝛼 ∙ 𝑇𝑡 , 𝑇𝑡 , 𝑇𝑙 +𝛽 ∙ 𝑇𝑡 ) 
s.t  
𝑤 ∙ (𝑇𝑤+𝛼 ∙ 𝑇𝑡 ) − 𝑋 = 0 
𝜏 − 𝑇𝑤 − 𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑙 = 0 
𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡,𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0 
 
Where 𝛼 and 𝛽 represent the quality adjusted share of time in the vehicle that is spent on work 
and leisure, respectively. 𝛼 + 𝛽 ≤ 1, since the sum of them has to be smaller than the total travel 
time. It is quality adjusted time in the sense that the work or leisure activity may be limited 
various ways or be of less quality compared to the corresponding activity taking place outside the 
vehicle. Hence, if the quality of the work and/or lesiure in the vehicle is less than what it is doing 
if outside the vehicle 𝛼 + 𝛽 < 1 even if all the time in the vehicle is spend on work and/or 
leisure. Further, the quality and share of time spent working in the car will be reflected in the 
wage. 
 
The Langrangian is 
 
ℒ = 𝑈(𝐶, 𝑇𝑤+𝛼 ∙ 𝑇𝑡 , 𝑇𝑡 , 𝑇𝑙 +𝛽 ∙ 𝑇𝑡 ) 
+𝜆 ∙ (𝑤 ∙ (𝑇𝑤+𝛼 ∙ 𝑇𝑡 ) − 𝑋) + 𝜇 ∙ (𝜏 − 𝑇𝑤 − 𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑙 ) + 𝜅 ∙ (𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡,𝑚𝑖𝑛 ) 
 





















∙ 𝛼 + 𝑤 ∙ 𝛼 ∙ 𝜆 − 𝜇 + 𝜅 = 0 
 
 



























































∙ 𝑤) ∙ (1 − 𝛽) 
 
























∙ (1 − 𝛼) ∙ +
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
∙ 𝑤 ∙ (1 − 𝛼) 
 
 





= 𝑤 ∙ (1 − 𝛼) +
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑇𝑤























= 𝑤 ∙ (1 − 𝛽) +
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑇𝑤





























∙ 𝑤 ∙ (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽) +
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑇𝑤












= 𝑤 ∙ (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽) +
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑇𝑤








If the car operator spends all the time in the car either on work or leisure activities (or both) and 
these are of equal quality as doing these activities outside the vehicle the sum1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽 would be 








Hence, VoTT would be equal to the money value of the intrinsic discomfort of being in a 
vehicle, and there would be no lost opportunity of using the time in the vehicle in a productive 
and/or meaningful way. 
 
  
S2. Relationship between the rebound effect, induced travel demand and 
elasticity with respect to generalised travel cost  
 
In the modeling presented in the main paper we argue that our demand elasticity with respected 
to variable Generalised Travel cost of -1 is consistent with a rebound of  about 0.2. In this SM we 
will derive this relationship similar to Goodwin (1996). 
 
TableSM 2.1: Explanation of variables used the analysis showing the link between different 
demand elasticties. 
G Variable General cost 
of travel 
D Distance 
C fuel cost 
T Time 
VoTT Value of Travel Time 
per unit of time 
O Other variable travel 
cost 
𝜀𝐶 Fuel cost elasticity 
(rebound effect) 
𝜀𝑇 Induced travel demand 
elasticity  
𝜀𝐺  GTC demand elasticity 
 
 
















 , where 𝜀𝑇 is approximately -1 to -0.5 (Andersson & Smidfelt Rosqvist, 2011; De 
Jong & Gunn, 2001; Goodwin, 1996). 
 








∆(𝐶 + 𝑂 + 𝑇 ∙ 𝑉𝑜𝑇𝑇)























Hence, given the estimates of the situation today in Sweden regarding costs of traveling (see the 
main text) and were the rebound effect has an elasticity of -0.2 the demand elasticity with respect 
to GTC (𝜀𝐺) estimated from the rebound effect would be roughly about -1.  
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Too Much Pressure?  
Driving and Restraining Forces and Pressures relating to the State of CAVs 
in Cities. 
Ella Rebalski, Marco Adelfio, Frances Sprei, Daniel J.A. Johansson 
 
Abstract 
Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAV) are predicted by many analysts to transform the 
transport system over the coming decades. Which direction and path this transformation will take is 
today highly uncertain. In this research we examine the introduction of CAVs in cities in terms of 
the indirect or underlying processes (drivers) and the direct expressions of interest that are related to 
specific actions, events or processes (pressures). The drivers and pressures are identified in 
interviews with stakeholders from across the quadruple helix (academia, industry, government and 
civil society). We then use a composite analytical framework that combines drivers (D) and pressures 
(P) of DPSIR model and force field analysis. This framework is used to map survey data on the 
strength of the driving and restraining forces and pressures behind the introduction of CAVs in 
cities, and to identify which stakeholders are involved in this socio-technical transition. Results 
showed that there was a strong belief across stakeholder groups that CAVs need to be connected 
with mobility planning and transportation strategies. Furthermore, frameworks that reconcile private 
technology development and public-led development of city planning were considered important, 
and politicians, mobility consultants, and urban planners emerged from the interviews as very active 
parts of an ecosystem of funding and expertise in pilot projects.  
Key Words: socio-technical transition, connected and autonomous vehicles, DPSIR, force field 
analysis 
1 Introduction   
Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAV) are predicted by many analysts to transform the 
transport system over the coming decades. Which path this transformation will take is today highly 
uncertain and the plausible, yet divergent, directions that this development may take are plentiful 
(Papa & Ferreira, 2018). Following Loorbach (2010)  it will imply transitions that intervene at 
different levels - e.g. cultural, structural and practical levels - that have different time frames and 
scales.  
These processes of transition can be facilitated or hindered by the indirect or underlying processes 
(drivers) and the direct expressions of interest that are related to specific actions, events or processes 
(pressures) (Adelfio et al., 2018). These drivers and pressures can in turn be represented by multiple 
stakeholders, and there is a knowledge gap on these matters which needs to be filled as they can 
impinge on the introduction of CAVs in cities. Therefore, this article aims at exploring the role, 




passenger transport in a sustainable direction at the local level, with special focus on the city of 
Gothenburg, Sweden. The following research questions (RQ) have been identified: 
RQ1: What are the driving and restraining forces and pressures, that facilitate or hinder the socio-
technical transition towards the introduction of CAVs at the city level?  
 
RQ2: What stakeholders, representative of the aforementioned driving/restraining forces and 
pressures, are involved in such a socio-technical transition? 
 
The remainder of this paper will first, in Section 2, provide some background information on the 
state of the art regarding CAVs and cities, stakeholders, and socio-technical transitions. Section 3 
explains the theoretical and analytical frameworks behind the methodology, and the methods used in 
this study. Section 4 gives a more detailed contextual background on the city of Gothenburg and 
CAV-related projects. Section 5 shows the empirical interview and survey data, and Section 6 
finishes with a discussion and conclusion. 
2 State of the Art 
2.1 CAVs and Cities 
Previous research has been devoted to various scenarios where CAVs are introduced into cities. 
However, the extent to which and the reasons why cities are considering facilitating the introduction 
of CAVs differ greatly depending on their size, geographic location, and political leaning (Freemark 
et al, 2019). 
  
The policy-related aspects of CAVs are affected by multi-level governmental institutions working to 
create integrated policies across all parts of the world. In Europe this means EU-level with country-
level coordination (Gavanas, 2019), and in the USA it means state- or federal-level coordination with 
municipal-level (Freemark et al, 2019). On a more local level, the lack of municipal government 
preparedness for CAVs is an issue that has arisen in the literature, but the lack of preparedness 
seems to stem from different perspectives and causes. In some cases, municipal officials have stated 
that they do not think their city is prepared for CAVs in terms of policy (Freemark et al, 2019), while 
in other cases this dearth is expressed as a need for more data to inform policy planning (Gavanas, 
2019), or a lack of investment in and understanding of the necessary infrastructure for CAVs 
(Duarte & Ratti, 2018). 
2.2 CAVs and Stakeholders 
When considering the introduction of CAVs to be a socio-technical transition, there arises an 
implicit need to engage with a multiplicity of stakeholders. However, the specific roles of different 
stakeholders in the transition are still underexplored, leaving a research gap regarding the role of 




few studies relating CAVs to stakeholders, Hess (2020, p. 9) discusses the different strategies that are 
used by civil society organisations in the USA in relation to a CAV transition, and finds that many of 
these groups support a “modest political goal”. In contrast, KPMG released a report in the early 
days of CAV popularity that discussed how CAVs could “…be profoundly disruptive for almost 
every stakeholder in the automotive ecosystem” (KPMG, 2012, p. 3).  
 
In terms of stakeholders who are commonly associated with CAVs, people with impaired mobility 
are often mentioned as being interested in the technology (Templeton, 2020). However, Fraedrichs 
et al. (2016) found that this group could be even less interested in CAVs as compared to those with 
full mobility. Nielsen and Haustein (2018) discuss the expectations of CAVs in regard to 
stakeholders in Denmark who are categorized as enthusiasts, indifferent stressed drivers, and 
skeptics. The enthusiasts were “typically male, young, highly educated, and live in large urban areas”, 
and the sceptics were " older, car reliant and more often live in less densely populated areas” 
(Nielsen & Haustein, 2018, p. 1). 
 
Legacy et al. (2019) discuss the importance of action on the part of transport researchers, in terms of 
creating new frameworks that can reconcile the private development of CAV technology, and the 
public-led development of city and transportation planning. In this case the researchers have a 
somewhat symbiotic relationship with municipal governments and industry, since the actions of 
government and industry provide material for the researchers.  The final result of this research, as 
Legacy et al. describe it, could also provide guidance to government and industry as they work to 
create new regulations.  
  
2.3 CAVs as leading to socio-technical transitions 
Geels (2004) suggests that by studying socio-technical systems, one can focus on the dynamic 
relationship between technology and society within a larger transition. When the transition to CAVs 
is viewed as a socio-technical system, the relationships between stakeholders and the evolving 
technology can be viewed as connections that channel driving forces, but also viewed as connections 
which create barriers. For example, Hopkins & Schwanen (2018) discuss how incumbents, in terms 
of industry and politics, have until now largely led the AV transition in the UK, and how this has led 
to lower levels of openness, democracy and participation from other groups. In this case the barriers 
are not necessarily against technological development, but rather barriers to inclusion. 
  
 Cohen & Cavoli (2019) take a different perspective on CAV transition, looking at the consequences 
of government intervention or lack thereof. They start from the hypothesis that a “laissez-faire” 
government approach to CAV regulation could create traffic issues and discuss which interventions 
might be most effective under certain conditions. This approach reflects much of the literature on 




regulations and policies for CAVs in cities (Legacy et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019; Milakis et al., 2017; 
Pernestål Brenden et al., 2017). 
3 Methodology  
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
  
This research is theoretically underpinned by a combination of transition management (Loorbach, 
2010) and stakeholder theories (Caputo, 2013). The former supports the idea that the introduction 
of CAVs will imply a socio-technical transition that “not only entail[s] new technologies, but also 
changes in markets, user practices, policy and cultural meanings” (Geels, 2010, p. 508).The need for 
stakeholder engagement stems from the fact that, when new technologies are emerging but still not 
implemented, such as the introduction of CAVs, their implications for society are connected to the 
future and difficult to conceptualize in the present (Geels, 2010).  
  
Another theoretical resource, in which this paper is grounded on, is field theory, originally conceived 
by Kurt Lewin within gestalt psychology and recently rediscovered by several contemporary scholars 
and applied in a broader context of organisation and social change (Burnes & Cooke, 2012; 
Cronshaw & McCulloch, 2008). This relates to the social dimension of transitions because it was 
“Lewin's belief that all behaviour arises from the psychological forces in a person's life space and 
that behavioural change arises from changes to these forces” (Burnes & Cooke, 2012, p. 412). 
Lewin’s field theory is the underpinning theory behind force-field analysis, although its translation 
into the analytical technique used here has been claimed to reduce the level of complexity, or even 
overcomplexity, embraced by Lewin (Burnes and Cooke, 2012). To counteract this, force-field 
analysis is here integrated in a more composite analytical framework described in the following 
section. 
3.2 Analytical Framework  
  
This paper utilized a composite analytical framework which uses force-field analysis as a mapping 
technique of driving and restraining forces for the transition towards the implementation of CAVs, 
using the DPS (Drivers, Pressures and States) components of the DPSIR model (Adelfio et al., 
2018). The DPS are taken from interviews with stakeholders. 
Force-field analysis is intertwined with DPS as a “technique for evaluating forces affecting change” 
(Thomas, 1985, p. 54) in relation to their positive and negative influence on the socio-technical 





In detail, the DPS components, where D and P can be negative or positive through a force-field 
perspective, are interpreted and used in the following way (based on previous work from Adelfio et 
al. 2018): 
 
Drivers: they can be driving (positive) or restraining (negative) forces, and are described in terms of 
broadly expressed factors or processes, e.g. environmental concerns. 
Pressures: related to each driver, pressures emerge in the interviews as expressions of more specific 
interests of different stakeholders. Some pressures related to the driving force of environmental 
concerns could be the need for less fuel use, shared cars easing CAV acceptance, and CAVs 
marketed as reducing the number of cars. 
State: the State, projected into the future, is the introduction of CAVs in cities. 
 
 
 Figure 1. A simplified diagram of the composite analytical framework, including quadruple helix, 
force field (driving and restraining forces and pressures), and the DPS (Drivers, Pressures and State) 
components of DPSIR. 
  
The stakeholders are grouped according to the Quadruple Helix, which is “an enhancement of the 
triple helix perspective that not only focuses on the actors from academia, government, and 





3.3 Materials and Methods  
  
This paper adopts a mixed method research approach, with a qualitative dominance. The research 
process goes through different steps. First, to achieve a sufficient diversity of perspectives, 
Gothenburg-related stakeholders have been categorized by using a Quadruple Helix Model (society, 
industry, academia and government), based on the model described by Carayannis & Campbell 
(2009).  
 
Second, eleven semi-structured interviews were conducted covering with a diversity of stakeholder 
categories reflecting the Quadruple Helix. The interviewees answered questions from an interview 
guide, but the interviewers also followed up on topics that were uniquely salient in specific 
interviews. All interviews were carried out in English, though the first language of many of the 
interviewees is Swedish. Due to the restrictions caused by Covid-19, all interviews took place via 
video call. 
 
Third, content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) is used then to analyse the semi-structured 
interviews.  The interview transcripts have been analysed to explore the DP components of the DPS 
framework, which have been described in Section 3.2.  
 
Fourth, and lastly, after the interview analysis an online survey was distributed to an expanded list of 
respondents, including interviewees and additional stakeholder categories which were mentioned in 
the interviews. A total of 21 people submitted responses. The survey asked respondents to rank 
driving and restraining pressures extracted from the stakeholder interviews on a 1 to 3 scale (weak, 
medium, strong). This ranking served to weight the force-field analytical mapping (see Section 5.3). 
The descriptions of each driving and restraining pressure used in the survey are the same as those in 
Table 4 and Table 5. 
 
The survey is used as a complement and to deepen the insights of the information that was extracted 
from the interviews, rather than a purely statistical validation of the interview data; we do not aim 
for any statistical significance from the survey. The data gathered from interviews was unexpectedly 
dense, and thus the first two sections of the survey exceeded 50 questions on the subjects of driving 
and restraining pressures. For this reason, in the findings, we will display the median value of each 
pressure to demonstrate its overall strength according to the respondents, and standard deviation to 
show the variation or dispersal of responses. Due to the large amount of information, the full results 
of survey are displayed in Appendix 1, while a simplified version including the most relevant data are 




4 Context Background  
4.1 Gothenburg: a city with a car-oriented tradition 
Gothenburg is a city historically linked to the production of cars, mainly associated with the Volvo 
brand. Statistics show that Volvo Cars and AB Volvo are both the largest employers in the 
Gothenburg Region (data from 2017) and those reporting the largest turnover in 2016 (Business 
Region Göteborg, 2018). Despite Volvo’s presence, the motorization rate of Gothenburg is lower 
than the two other major cities in Sweden (327 passenger cars per 1000 persons against 352 in 
Malmö and 361 in Stockholm), see Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Passenger cars in use in the biggest Swedish municipalities, Västra Götaland and Sweden at 
the end of year 2019 
Place Passenger cars in use Total number of cars per 1000 persons 
Stockholm       352 138 361 
Malmö           120 967 352 
Göteborg        189 565 327 
Västra Götaland Region 789 311 458 
Sweden 4 887 904 474 
(Trafikanalys, 2020)  
 
In 2014 The City of Gothenburg created a transportation strategy for the city with the target year 
2035. The Gothenburg Transport Strategy for a Close-Knit City covers a range of transportation-related 
measures, including increasing public transportation use so that it makes up 55% of motorized trips 
(Helleberg et al., 2014). The city started measuring the breakdown of trips by private car, public 
transportation, bicycle and on foot in 2011. Since then, public transportation has increased by 
approximately 33% to become 30% of total trips. Table 2 shows the breakdown between different 








Table 2: Percentage of different transportation modes out of all the trips taken in, to, and from 
Gothenburg. 
Transport mode (% of total number 
of trips) 
2011 2019 2035 goal 
Car 48% 43% 29% 
Public Transportation 25% 30% 36% 
Bicycle 5% 7% 12% 
Pedestrian 22% 21% 23% 
 Figure redrawn from (Trafikkontoret, 2019) 
 
The Gothenburg Transport Strategy for a Close-Knit City makes a passing mention of CAVs, but they are 
not explicitly stated as a tool for helping to reach the 2035 goals. Since 2014, however, the city of 
Gothenburg has been involved in a number of projects that examine potential effects of CAVs (see 
Table 3). These projects are diverse in scope, some relate specifically to freight, others to liveable 
neighbourhoods, and others to completely digitalised solutions to CAV regulation. Taken all 
together, this shows that the City of Gothenburg is emphatically engaged in developing plans for 
CAV use in Gothenburg. 
 
 Perhaps the most well-known of these is a project called Drive Me, which included many partners, 
but was best known for being a collaboration with Volvo Cars that aimed to loan families in 
Gothenburg self-driving Volvo cars and observe their travel behaviour (Rothoff et al., 2019). Drive 
Me did not reach as many families as originally planned and the level of automation was less than 
planned (level 2 instead of level 4). Volvo Cars presented the results from the project in spring of 
2020, stating that most of the findings were safety-related (SAFER, 2020). 
 
Another finished project that focused on CAVs in Gothenburg was CoEXist. The “Shared spaces” 
use case examined the potential traffic effects if last mile service were to be implemented in 
Kungsportsplatsen, a square in the city centre where cars, pedestrians, cyclists and other forms of 
travelers share the area. The simulation showed that CAVs could take longer than conventional 
vehicles “to cross a shared space, due to the speed limit compliance that is assumed for [CAVs] but 
also due to their ‘passiveness’ in comparison to a conventional car”(CoExist, 2020, p. 19). But the 
simulation also showed that pedestrians would not experience much difference compared with 







Table 3: CAV-related projects related to the City of Gothenburg. 
Project name Start Main Partners  
AD Aware Traffic Control 2016 Ericsson, Carmenta, Swedish Transport Administration 
Drive Me 2017 Volvo Cars 
Coexist 2017 VTI, and more 
Virtual Reality Lab in 
Gothenburg 
2016 Drive Sweden, RISE, Vinnova 
DenCity 2016 Vinnova, Closer, RISE, Swedish Traffic and Public Transport Authority, 
and more 
Digitalized Infrastructure - 
Environmental and Speed Zones 
2018 Volvo Cars, AB Volvo, Scania 
NordicWay2 2018 Public and private actors in Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark 
S3: Shared Shuttle Services 2017 RISE, and more 
(Göteborgs Stad, 2020) 
 
 
5 Empirical Work  
5.1 Stakeholders 
The empirical work section shows the interview and survey results. The driving and restraining forces and 
pressures presented are extracted from the interview transcripts based on the application of the DPS model.  
It is important to know which stakeholders identify different driving and restraining forces and pressures, 
because future analysis can be done in future research on the levels of legitimacy, urgency, and power of each 
stakeholder (Mitchell et al., 1997), using the same interview data. In the following section Table 4 and Table 5 
display the connections between driving and restraining forces, pressures, and stakeholders. The following 
stakeholder types were identified in the interviews as being relevant in this context:  
• Car user (passenger or driver) 
• Car producer (individual companies) 
• Car industry  
• Mobility users who cannot drive 
• Generic citizen 
• Public transport provider 
• Private transport provider 




• Land owner 
• Land developer 
• Urban planner 
• Politician 
• Mobility consultant  
6 Analysis and Findings from the application of the DPS model 
6.1 Driving forces and pressures 
In the interviews the following driving forces were identified: environmental concerns, market 
economy, technological advance, urban planning, politics and policy, health, and socio-cultural 
habits.  
The driving pressures, related to each driving force, emerge in the interviews as expressions of 
interests of different stakeholders such as companies, environmentalists, citizens, or authorities. 
Therefore, the terms interest and pressure are used as synonyms in this section.  
Table 4 summarizes the driving forces, associated driving pressures, and associated stakeholders. In 
this section, each interviewee is connected to their quadruple helix category, but not identified in a 




Within the environmental concerns as a driving force, the pressure to reduce fuel consumption 
comes from both car users and the car industry.  CAVs could do this by potentially driving slower 
and more smoothly as compared to human drivers, with one interviewee pointing out that “[CAVs] 
will not speed or accelerate very rapidly” (Interview 8, Industry). 
Another pressure is exerted by environmentally concerned citizens. Here one interviewee suggested 
that CAVs as shared cars would be more accepted by “people concerned about the environment of 
citizens and our sustainable neighbourhoods and cities because if every person should have its own 
self-driving vehicles, then it’s not the right way, in my personal opinion, to reach a sustainable 
society” (Interview 10, Industry). Another interviewee highlighted that existing shuttle bus pilot 
projects could be considered shared rides, so “if we can leverage the head start of shared rides, that 
might mitigate against a lot of the negatives associated with if just everybody who drives a regular 




Among citizens, a pressure with positive environmental effects is expressed by those who are 
inclined to replace cars with a mix of travel modes for economic reasons, for example “people who 
are on the edge of trying to choose to save a lot more money and engage in biking … that would be 
a group that should have a vested interest in either the AV shuttles... and in some combination with 
the AV taxis” (Interview 3, Academia). 
Market Economy 
The market economy system emerged clearly as a major driving force. In this case, market economy 
as force is expressed as market capitalism in a broader sense involving supply and demand of 
products, profit seeking and accumulation of wealth.  
Particularly relevant as an expression of pressure are “companies, of course, if wanting to produce 
the cars” (Interview 1, Industry). One interviewee mentioned an event where car industry actors 
were asked “how many of you are working on a product you want cities to buy?” (Interview 3, 
Academia) and every person raised their hand. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the car 
industry is a source of pressure and has an interest in collaborating with local authorities to facilitate 
CAV introduction. 
One specific part of this is the interest from the car industry in adapting streets to CAVs, since, for 
example “if you look at the experiment of Volvo, currently ongoing, it is limited to certain streets 
because they’re the streets that are relatively simple to manage from a technology point of view” 
(Interview 4, Civil Society). 
The pressure from the car industry is also expressed through marketing and advertisement 
techniques as commercials shape the imagery of CAVs. One interviewee even mentioned that “it’s 
quite hard to separate how I envision them from the commercials” (Interview 7, Government). 
Another pressure is represented by mobility companies who stand to gain from CAV development, 
such as “Robo taxis, mobility as a service (MaaS) fleets … it’s really the companies that have most of 
the interest” (Interview 3, Academia). For MaaS providers, the “financial benefit is if you pay wages 
to your cab driver or to your bus driver or to your lorry driver and you can replace them with 
technology” (Interview 4, Civil Society).  
In the countryside, the interest of developers and property owners can be a source of pressure as 
cheap land away from the city centre can become more accessible with CAVs. One interviewee put 
forward that “I think it will be inevitable that private interests buy cheap land outside of cities” 
(Interview 1, Industry), as CAVs make longer car travel easier.  
Technological advance 
When considering CAVs an expression of technological advance, one pressure is exerted by the 




other” (Interview 1, Industry). This pressure comes from car users, who stand to gain in terms of 
time and reduced stress if they no longer have to park their own vehicle, and property developers 
who may be able renovate or redesign parking garages to be smaller and use the excess space for 
other purposes. 
Another expression of interest from a user perspective constituting a pressure is that CAVs  “tend 
not to take larger risks as humans do, when they drive … so they expect to not be involved in as 
many accidents as humans” (Interview 8, Industry). 
A specific pressure comes from IT industry, where much of the technology development for CAVs 
started. As one interviewee phrased it: “The IT industry really kicked all this off. There were already 
plenty of folks in computation, working on mapping and they kind of said, ‘hey, we’ve got enough 
infrastructure in the computation field. We think we can really make driverless cars happen’ ” 
(Interview 3, Academia). The IT industry has historically been interested in creating a partnership 
with car industry, and “that’s where an amazing amount of money and human intelligence effort has 
gone” (Interview 3, Academia). 
A rather surprising pressure that emerged is that citizens tend to take for granted that new 
technology is necessary and useful, and daily routines should be adapted to use that new technology 
rather than the other way around. This was expressed by the interviewee as:  
“Instead of having the technology that’s new and then making up the need for it… what does the 
city need or what does its people need and then what is the role of autonomous vehicles?” 
(Interview 6, Industry). 
The emergence of electrification of cars represents another pressure towards the introduction of 
CAVs. In fact, those actors involved in electrification of cars can also have an interest in CAVs, as 
emerging from in the interviews, in which electrification of CAVs is deemed as positive from an 
economic perspective but also leading to quieter and cleaner city centres. As this interviewee said: 
“there’s so much economic sense for [CAVs] to be electric, but that might take some time before 
they really all are, but if they all are electric, that means that the denser parts of cities will be quieter, 
have less emissions and suddenly, our urban streets will be so much more liveable” (Interview 3, 
Academia). 
Urban planning 
Urban planning as a driving force is related to multiple stakeholders exerting different types of 
pressures. One example is consultants that support local government in understanding the role of 
CAVs in city mobility. One interviewee explained how consultants “could do more projects like 
we’ve already done like helping cities develop a strategy on how they should react to these kinds of 




Town planners of rural areas can be also interested in the introduction of CAVs. The question of 
rural areas and the need for more viable public transport is linked both to market economy as 
driving force but also to urban planning in a broader sense, including mobility. In fact, rural areas for 
which public transport is not economically effective, “could have self-driving mobility service 
systems” (Interview 6, Industry). 
Lastly, those actors involved in CAV pilot studies exert pressure towards introduction of CAVs. The 
interviewee mentioned that “One thing that’s already happening in this city is gaining knowledge 
from these pilot studies” (Interview 6, Industry). 
Politics and policy 
Sometimes intertwined with urban planning, politics and policy issues also emerged as a driving 
force per se. In particular, politicians are an expression of pressure as they enable CAV introduction 
in cities. One interviewee stated that “[city bureaucrats] also have, as a response to the wishes of all 
our politicians, independent or whatever political party they represent, we produced this strategy for 
how we, as an administration, will work with electrification, digitalisation and automation of the 
transportation system over the next coming three years” (Interview 9, Government). 
On another political level, “the Swedish government has supported the car industry for a long time 
because they’re very dependent on them (…) and at the same time, making people drive less because 
it’s bad for the environment and for health…” (Interview 6, Industry). 
Moreover, the car industry has historically been reliant on local authorities to create the 
infrastructure for mobility, so their pressure will impact on local authorities as enablers of a 
transition towards CAVs implementation: “The traditional car industry, if you call it that, they have 
been very reliant on governments and cities building infrastructure to make people having to buy a 
car to survive … so governments and planners will still be powerful actors in this transition” 
(Interview 6, Industry). 
Those authorities that are keen on periodically upgrading infrastructure, are also exerting a positive 
pressure towards the introduction of CAVs.  The latter is facilitated by “the quality of their 
infrastructure and the likelihood of their continued investment in infrastructure” (Interview 3, 
Academia). 
Health 
The question of health was mentioned with regards to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, which can 
also be a source of pressure. For instance, autonomous vehicles can give necessary adaptivity during 
health crisis situations. One interviewee spontaneously brought up the Covid-19 pandemic, saying “I 
was just reflective of how that will impact [the introduction of CAVs], the total that drive and the 
public transport, that goes in different directions, right?” (Interview 2, Industry), meaning both that 




public transportation patterns (e.g. more frequent busses so that there could be fewer people on 
each bus), CAVs could help facilitate that need. 
Public transport drivers have been mentioned as they can feel unsafe in a pandemic. Moreover, 
“that’s a whole lot of discussion of how any form of shared rides, really, how does it adapt to the 
virus and even still, post virus, if people continue to feel pretty nervous about it for quite some 
time” (Interview 3, Academia). 
Socio-cultural habits 
Society and social culture constitute a major driving force. Within the group of users that can be 
interested in CAVs, those who are accustomed to using cabs or public transit as driven by someone 
else, they could be prepared for CAVs because “in terms of services, it’s nothing new because we 
already have taxis and public transport” (Interview 4, Civil Society). 
Time saving convenience is also a reason for individuals to be interested in CAVs since while the car 
is moving, “you can do other things, as a single person” although there can be “a big risk that the 
autonomous self-driving vehicles could lead to extensive use of single person transport because it 
becomes very convenient and you don’t lose any more working time or leisure time while being in 
transport” (Interview 5, Government, Academia and Civil Society). 
Other types of interests stem from diverse kinds of demands of societal groups. For instance, 
“People living in the central areas would have an interest in that they could use a car when they need 
to and not have to own one” (Interview 6, Industry). 
Other groups exerting pressure are represented by “groups in society that would like to have new 
cars, flash and shiny with the new kind of cars and vehicles” (Interview 7, Industry) . 
Mobility users who are not able to drive could exert a pressure towards CAV, since “one third of the 
population, approximately, can’t drive, they’re too young, too old, too disabled, they’ll have an 
enormous interest, I think, in autonomous vehicles of any kind, especially the private” (interview 3, 
Academia). 
Finally, a more complex type of societal pressure stems from multi-stakeholder collaboration, 
including different levels of government, academia and industry, all working together on vehicle 
legislation and new regulatory systems. This can be summarized by one of the interviewees who said: 
“In Sweden, we work very much with the vehicle legislation work, both within the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe regulatory work, but also in the EU and we also have 






Table 4: Driving Forces, Pressures and key stakeholders.  
Driving Force Driving Pressure Key Stakeholders 
Environmental 
Concerns 
CAVs expected to drive smoother and slower, using less fuel Car User, 
politician  
Car sharing would make CAVs more acceptable for environmentally-
sensitive people 
Generic citizen 
People selling their cars and using shared CAVs Car user 
Market 
Economy 
Economic interest of car producers  Car producer 
Interest from Mobility-as-a-service providers e.g. car sharing 
companies,  Uber... (saving money by not paying drivers) 
MaaS provider 
Promotion and marketing shaping idealized, futuristic imagery of 
CAVs 
Car producer 
Cheap land away from city centre can become more accessible with 









Expectation of improved safety with CAVs Car user 
IT industry interested in partnership with car industry IT industry, car 
industry 
New technologies' (such as CAVs) usefulness taken for granted IT industry, car 
industry, car user 
Electrification of cars helps CAV promotion (as it provides multiple 
benefits for CAVs such as energy efficiency, money saving, less noise) 
Car producer, 
transport 
provider, car user 
Urban 
Planning 
Mobility consultants supporting local authorities shape visions for the 
mobility of the future 
Mobility 
consultants 
Need for improved mobility in rural areas (public transport not 
currently economically efficient) 
Urban planners 
Pilot studies are being conducted which anticipate CAVs introduction Multi-stakeholder 
Politics and 
Policy 
Politicians need to understand the implications of CAVs in cities Politicians 
Government economically dependent on (or, at least, tightly 
intertwined with) car industry 
Politicians 
Authorities with a history of continued investments in upgrading 
infrastructure can be more responsive when adapting to CAVs 
Politicians 
Health 
Covid-19 exacerbating need for flexible transport Generic citizen 




People using taxis and public transit are prepared for CAVs, especially 
shared CAVs 
Generic citizen 
Demand for productive use of time (work or recreation) while driving Car user 
Some urban dwellers prefer not to own cars (and instead demand 
shared CAVs) 
Generic citizen 
People interested in cars and new technologies in general can be 
interested in CAVs 
Generic citizen 
People who cannot drive (e.g. elderly, disabled…) have more 
opportunities with CAVs 
Generic citizen 





6.2 Restraining forces and pressures 
The restraining forces appearing in the interviews were: technological advance, environmental 
concerns, socio-cultural habits, health, urban planning, market economy, and politics and policy. 
The restraining pressures are also connected to a set of stakeholders and pose a series of challenges 
to the development and subsequent introduction of CAVs in cities. Table 5 summarizes the 
restraining forces, associated restraining pressures and associated stakeholders. 
Technological advance 
In relation to technological advance, several pressures contribute to it as a restraining force. One 
example is related to the user perspective, as new technologies need to be mature and safe before 
being introduced. An interviewee stated that “the vehicles, of course, need to be safe, secure and 
they also need to be trusted, both for the users, but also for other persons around in the traffic 
environment” (Interview 8, Industry) 
There is also a security risk from the ICT developer side, given the risk of CAVs being hacked. It 
was pointed out in an interview that “It’s been already proven, if somebody wants to get in [digitally] 
and turn off the vehicle, they can do that super easily” (Interview 3, Academia). 
Finally, from a city perspective, the interviewees detected the fear that cities become built around 
CAVs, rather than the other way around, which constitutes also a restraining pressure. The 
interviewees suggested that “Most cities have actually been adapted to the car technology, rather 
than the other way around and I think there is a certain risk that this will be repeated” (Interview 4, 
Civil Society) 
Environmental concerns 
The first example of a restraining pressure related to the restraining force of environmental concerns 
is that the sustainability targets of local authorities could go against the introduction of CAVs, but 
since the little is known yet about CAVs “it’s very important to see the environmental impact from 
those because the environmental impact will most likely play an important role in the political 
agenda” (Interview 2, Industry). 
In particular, from the consumer/user side, the question of energy efficiency has emerged, phrased 
as such: “If the autonomous vehicles get so effective that people use them a lot, meaning you see 
more energy, then we have to produce more energy somewhere” (Interview 1, Industry). 
Furthermore, the interviewees  also underline the risk of having electric CAVs due to an increase of 
energy demand, stating that “…even if we go for electrical, we have to produce the electricity in 
some way” (Interview 5, Government, Academia and Civil Society). 
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From the perspective of local authorities, environmental quality norms in cities can represent a 
restraining pressure, especially if CAVs are not electric. One interviewee mentioned that “We still 
have some challenges in the City of Gothenburg, at least, to the local environmental quality norms. 
We have some challenges, day to day, (…) and here, I think that the self-driving vehicles cannot, in 
themselves, contribute to an increased air quality” (Interview 7, Government) 
Lastly, specific environmental concerns are expressed by those who are worried about urban sprawl. 
This restraining pressure was stated very clearly: “These self-driving vehicles could contribute to 
urban sprawl more than densification.” (Interview 7, Government) 
Socio-cultural habits 
Society (and more specifically, socio-cultural aspects of it) functions as a driving force, delineated 
through a set of restraining pressures, primarily related to the car user perspective.  
Other specific societal groups are mentioned as a source of restraining pressures against the 
introduction of CAVs. Among them, the interviewees have posed the question of people passionate 
for conspiracy theories: “People who often see conspiracies don’t often like big corporations, 
monopolies, anti-technology of any kind and I think there’s a part of society who would be against 
them for those reasons” (Interview 3, Academia). Another group that “could be against it, it could 
be people who are very fond of driving themselves” (Interview 5, Government, Academia and Civil 
Society), meaning that, among other things, these people may not want to give up the control 
associated with driving a vehicle. 
Furthermore, another segment of the population simply dislikes automobiles per se and would 
certainly not contribute to a diffusion of CAVs, as detected in the interviews: “… a lot of people 
who don’t like cars” (Interview 9, Government). The context in this particular interview was a 
longer discussion about a widely negative reaction from at a workshop presentation involving a car-
centric plan for the introduction of CAVs. 
An even more specific societal group generating restraining pressure against the introduction of 
CAVs is represented by elderly people, who are often reluctant or skeptical towards technology. It 
was suggested in the interviews that “As everything about technology, it can be harder for elderly 
people, to learn and to trust, of course” (Interview 10, Industry). 
Finally, cycling organisations are mentioned as they do not trust CAVs to be in the street. For 
instance, one interviewee mentions “cycling organisations” as “you need to build trust in the society, 
can we trust to have vehicles running out on the street?” (Interview 10, Industry) 
Health 
Concerns about health have emerged as a restraining force. A restraining pressure is exerted by 
urbanists who associate car-dependency with public health issues. There is a specific concern that 
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AV may increase congestion, as stated by this interviewee: “I think urbanists, at least some of them, 
thinking of health issues and being stuck in cars all the time” (Interview 1, Industry). The ongoing 
Covid-19 pandemic could also generate pressure against vehicle sharing, interviewees noted that 
“when the Corona Virus showed up, I thought that maybe people won’t like to share items at all in 
the future, unless there is some disinfection procedure” (Interview 5, Government, Academia and 
Civil Society).  
Urban planning 
From an urban planning perspective, a restraining pressure against CAVs stems from the goal of 
prioritizing walking, biking and public transit. It was suggested in the interviews that it is an 
important urban planning goal to prioritize “towards walking, biking and public transit … so we 
don’t have a complete car-oriented city all over again” (Interview 1, Industry). 
In general, urban development is considered to be geared more towards sharing than self-driving, 
this could generate a restraining pressure against the introduction of CAVs, since “The 
implication(s) on the urban development are far more on the sharing side than on the actual self-
driving technology side” (Interview 4, Civil Society). 
Finally, “what kind of streets should be designed for [CAVs] is a problem” (Interview 6, Industry), 
constituting negative pre-conditions and therefore, a restraining pressure against them. 
Market economy 
Despite its value as a propeller or driving force, the market economy can also act as a restraining 
force, connected to different restraining pressures. In the interviews, for instance, CAVs are 
mentioned as competitors with providers of public transport, so the latter can be a source of 
restraining pressure against them. One interviewee, while reflecting on the interests of different 
stakeholders, stated that “we ultimately can see that self-driving passenger cars can also be a 
competitor for the public transport needs” (Interview 2, Industry). 
From a financial perspective, a negative pressure can stem from local authorities, “in terms of the 
city itself which will be an obstacle because they simply can’t afford dual infrastructure.” (Interview 
4, Civil Society). It can be excessively expensive for public finance to invest in dual infrastructure for 
conventional public transportation and also for CAVs. 
Lastly, other multiple stakeholders “must also make sure that [they] reduce the risk of mis-
investment” (Interview 9, Government), meaning these stakeholders could contribute to the set of 
negative pressures against CAVs, if they consider CAVs in terms of risks for wrong investments.  
Politics and policy 
As current regulations and laws might not be suitable, the need for their adaptation can constitute a 
negative pressure against CAVs introduction in cities. One interview pointed out that “all of the 
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regulations on all of this, so I think we’re just still at a pretty early, early steps.” (Interview 3, 
Academia). This causes “standardisation issues, but in terms of rules and regulation, they need to be 
internationalised” (Interview 4, Civil Society). 
In general, the interviews have highlighted the lack of consensus on what authorities want for cities, 
which can be a remarkable restraining pressure. Stated clearly: “Well, there’s no consensus, is there. 
There’s not a given answer of what kind of cities we want and of course, there is a political question 
as well because they’re different views” (Interview 4, Civil Society). 
A still insufficient knowledge from local authorities constitutes a significant restraining pressure, 
where “[local authorities] want to know and need to know more about what does this mean for our 
city and our region, how can we contribute or how can we benefit from it? That’s in an early phase, I 
would say, even in Gothenburg” (Interview 6, Industry). 
Finally, there are many important ethical challenges related to CAV policy design that have yet to be 
resolved, “if the vehicle has to make a decision between hitting and killing a pedestrian or hurting 
the people inside the vehicle and possible killing them in the vehicle, which way do you want it to 















Table 5: Restraining forces and pressures  
Restraining 
Force 




New technologies need to be mature and safe before being introduced to users (e.g. safety 
concerns from fatal CAV accidents). 
Car producer, car user, 
IT industry 
Fear of CAV technology being hacked Car user 
Fear that cities become built around CAVs, rather than creating a liveable city and adapting 




The sustainability agenda of local authorities can go against the introduction of CAVs, as 
their environmental impact is unclear 
Politicians and urban 
planners 
More cars means increased energy demand Car producer and car 
user 
If CAVs are electric: Environmental movement concerned that increased electricity supply  
will come from fossil fuels 
Generic citizen 
If CAVs are not electric: both air quality norms and climate policy could restrict the increase 
of CAVs based internal combustion engine vehicles 
Generic citizen 





Conspiracy theories and misinformation about new technologies Generic citizen 
The group of people who do not want to give up control of their vehicle Car user 
People who do not like cars Generic citizen 
Elderly people who are sceptical of new technology Elder people 
Cyclists are particularly sceptical about CAVs, in terms of safety and access to urban space Cyclist 
Health Concern that CAVs may increase congestion Generic citizen, urban 
planner 
Covid-19 pandemic and fear of shared vehicles Generic citizen 
Urban Planning 
Walking, biking and public transit as planning priority, not CAVs Urban planners 
In urban development policies the shared use of cars is deemed as more important than the 
self-driving aspect 
Urban planners and 
politicians 
Streets are not currently designed for CAVs Urban planners 
Market Economy 




Dual infrastructure (for CAVs and conventional vehicles) is expensive Politicians and urban 
planners 
Risk of investing in a technology that fails on the market (e.g. if users don't purchase CAVs 




Current international and national laws and regulations are not suitable for CAVs Politicians 
Lack of political consensus on visions for the future in cities Politicians 
Lack of knowledge and agreement about strategies from local authorities Politicians 
The ethical question of who has priority when there is a risk for collision between a 









6.3 Force field Map 
The survey results showed which level of strength respondents assigned to each driving and restraining 
pressure, on a scale of weak (1), medium (2) or strong (3), in terms of the effect of the pressures on the 
introduction of CAVs in cities. Using the results of the survey, we have created a simplified forcefield map to 
highlight which of the 52 pressures identified in the interviews were considered to be strongest and weakest 
by the 21 survey respondents.  This was done by calculating the median strength of each pressure to 
determine the centre-most level of strength that respondents assigned to each individual pressure. We then 
removed all the pressures that had a median value of 2, following the rationale that since these pressures are 
not particularly strong or weak they can be accepted as relevant, but they do not stand out. 
 
The blue bar in Figure 1 is median value of the strength of each pressure. The standard deviation of each 
pressures shows how large the spread of the assigned strengths was. If the standard deviation is larger, the 
respondent’s choices formed a larger range of assigned strengths, and vice versa. The standard deviation is 
represented by the whisker lines in Figure 1.  
 
We can see that the driving pressure with the highest median value was that of interest from Mobility-as-a-
Service companies (median = 3). These companies could save money by not having to pay drivers when using 
CAVs. The general electrification trend, and the partnership between the IT industry and the car industry, 
were tied as the driving pressures with the next highest median (median = 2.5). On the other side, the 
restraining pressures with the largest negative median value were the potential for increased energy demand 
from non-shared CAVs being attractive to use more than a conventional car (median = -3), and safety 
concerns relating to fatal CAV accidents (, median = -3). 
 
Intuitively, one of the driving pressures with the lowest median fits well with one of the restraining pressures 
with the highest negative median. CAVs using less fuel (median = 1, s.d. = 0.79), is identified as a weak 
driving pressure, while the potential for increased energy demand (median = -3, s.d. = 0.68) is seen as a 
strong restraining pressure. This makes sense from an engineering perspective since CAVs are expected to 
reduce specific energy consumption (Wh/km) by driving more smoothly and interacting in a more efficient 
way with other vehicles and with infrastructure, but CAV technology will likely increase the demand for car 
mobility (Taiebat et al., 2018). Hence, one could argue that most respondents do not see CAVs as a way to 
reduce emissions, and our interpretation of this is that they believe that the demand impacts override the 
potential impacts of increasing the energy efficiency of the individual vehicle or vehicle system level.  
 
It is important to remember that these survey results should be viewed as complementary to the interview 
data, meaning that Figure  gives an idea of how the different pressures brought up in the interviews are 
perceived at a more general level. As was mentioned in Section 3.3, these results are not meant to be self-






Figure 2: Selected Force Field Map showing all survey results for all pressures that did not have a 
median value of 2. 
 
7 Discussion and Conclusions  
This section refers back to the research questions and how empirical findings and literature 
contribute to the discussion. 
 
RQ1: What are the driving and restraining forces and pressures that facilitate or hinder socio-
technical transition towards the introduction of CAVs at the city level? 
 
In general, it was clear from the interviews and survey that CAVs are not universally seen as positive, 
but rather that many stakeholders believe CAVs need to be connected to mobility planning and 
public transport strategies. This was expressed both explicitly, where interviewees mentioned 
specific policy actions (such as local government studies, infrastructure planning, and safety 
regulations); and implicitly, when they expressed worry about what could happen if CAVs are 
introduced without any guidance. This need for planning in other jurisdictions has been discussed at 
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length by Freemark et al. (2019), Gavanas (2019), Duarte and Ratti (2018), and now the results of 
our force-field mapping show that this need is also present in the Swedish context. 
 
An important driving pressure identified in the interviews and related to the Swedish context was an 
economic dependence on the car industry as being one of the largest employers in Sweden, 
particularly evident in Gothenburg. This is not new information, but it is important to take into 
consideration when analysing the forces related to the introduction of CAVs, in a similar approach 
to that taken by Legacy et al. (2019), where the authors compared the results of semi-structured 
interviews and academic literature to see if there were common concerns regarding CAV governance 
and planning. In our study, a common restraining pressure was a fear that Swedish cities would be 
designed around CAVs, as they were once designed around cars, as opposed to being designed with 
people in focus.  This is a concern that has been brought up in literature by Lundin (2014), when 
examining the development of Swedish transportation and private car ownership post World War II. 
Dominance on the part of one actor, such as the car industry, can lead to one-sided development, 
which is why frameworks that reconcile private technology development, and public-led 
development of city planning, are important.  
 
RQ2: What stakeholders, representative of the aforementioned driving and restraining forces and 
pressures, are involved in such a socio-technical transition? 
 
The complete list of stakeholders that was identified in the interviews was discussed in the empirical 
work section. Within this list, there are some stakeholder types who have been discussed at length in 
previous academic work, for example disadvantaged people that are not able to drive (Fraedrich et 
al., 2016; Templeton, 2020).  
 
Another stakeholder connection to Gothenburg, but also one that is generalizable to cities 
internationally, relates to the role of participants in pilot projects and involved consultancy 
companies that promote the introduction of CAVs. Politicians, mobility consultants, and urban 
planners emerged from the interviews as very active parts of an ecosystem of funding and expertise 
that has been created around these pilots. These pilots are also connected to the car industry, of 
course through the technology itself but also through the driving pressure of commercials that was 
identified in the interviews.  This pressure was expressed as the idea that it was hard for the 
interviewee to imagine CAVs as anything other than how they are shown in commercials created by 
companies within the automobile industry. These commercials, created for the purpose of selling 
cars, often portray CAVs in a very positive light (Hildebrand & Sheller, 2018). 
 
During this phase the limits of CAV technology are still uncertain, and the theoretical potential is 
emphasized. Drive Me (Rothoff et al., 2019) is an excellent example of a pilot that had fairly 
unexciting results compared to the initial expectations, but the project still served to increase 
awareness regarding the potential of the technology. This could arguably have had just as large of an 
impact as the technical findings did. Pilot projects are recognized in academic literature as being an 
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important part of the development of CAV development, but it is important that they allow for 
“critical citizen engagement and participatory deliberation” (Mladenović et al., 2020, p. 258). 
Whether or not the pilot projects that have taken place in Gothenburg meet this threshold of citizen 
participation could be the basis for future research. 
 
There are also stakeholders who are related to the socio-cultural and environmental restraining 
forces, who exert negative pressures against CAVs due to a variety of concerns including safety and 
environmental damage. Skepticism against new technology is certainly not a new phenomenon, but 
in this case the convergence of different stakeholders is potentially unique. Elderly people, cyclists, 
people who are concerned because of conspiracies related to new technology, and those who are 
concerned about environmental effects form quite a broad range, which encompasses stakeholders 
with characteristics from both the enthusiasts and the sceptics that are defined by Neilsen and 
Haustein (2018).  It is important to note here that Neilsen and Haustein used primary data directly 
from the stakeholders in question, whereas the data in this study are respondent’s views on these 
stakeholders. Nonetheless, this grouping of unlikely bedfellows could represent a new category of 
stakeholder who may have a significant impact on the introduction of CAVs in cities. 
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Complete Force Field Map of all Pressures
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p1 Economic interest of car producers 
p2 Promotion and marketing shaping idealized, futuristic imagery of CAVs 
p3 Interest from Mobility-as-a-service providers e.g. car sharing companies,  Uber... (saving 
money by not paying drivers) 
p4 Cheap land away from city centre can become more accessible with CAVs (attractive for land 
owners and developers) 
p5 If cars drive and park further away from cities, urban parking lots can be converted into more 
profitable use 
p6 CAVs expected to drive smoother and slower, using less fuel 
p7 Car sharing would make CAVs more acceptable for environmentally-sensitive people 
p8 People using taxis and public transit are prepared for CAVs, especially shared CAVs 
p9 People selling their cars and using shared CAVs 
p10 Expected efficiency advantages with self-driving and self-parking technology  
p11 Expectation of improved safety with CAVs 
p12 IT industry interested in partnership with car industry 
p13 New technologies' (such as CAVs) usefulness taken for granted 
p14 Electrification of cars helps CAV promotion (as it provides multiple benefits for CAVs such as 
energy efficiency, money saving, less noise) 
p15 Mobility consultants supporting local authorities shape visions for the mobility of the future 
p16 Need for improved mobility in rural areas (public transport not currently economically 
efficient) 
p17 Pilot studies are being conducted which anticipate CAVs introduction 
p18 Politicians need to understand the implications of CAVs in cities 
p19 Government economically dependent on (or, at least, tightly intertwined with) car industry 
p20 Authorities with a history of continued investments in upgrading infrastructure can be more 
responsive when adapting to CAVs 
p21 Covid-19 exacerbating need for flexible transport 
p22 Covid-19 makes public transport drivers feel unsafe 
p23 Demand for productive use of time (work or recreation) while driving 
p24 Some urban dwellers prefer not to own cars (and instead demand shared CAVs) 
p25 People interested in cars and new technologies in general can be interested in CAVs 
p26 People who can not drive (e.g. elderly, disabled…) have more opportunities with CAVs 
p27 Ongoing work on legislation and regulations as preparatory work for CAVs 
p28 Walking, biking and public transit as planning priority, not CAVs 
p29 In urban development policies the shared use of cars is deemed as more important than the 
self-driving aspect 
p30 Streets are not currently designed for CAVs 
p31 Public transport providers see CAV as competitors, and thus want to hinder CAV introduction 
p32 The sustainability agenda of local authorities can go against the introduction of CAVs, as their 
environmental impact is unclear 
p33 More cars means increased energy demand 
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p34 If CAVs are electric: Environmental movement concerned that increased electricity supply  will 
come from fossil fuels 
p35 If CAVs are not electric: both air quality norms and climate policy could restrict the increase of 
CAVs based internal combustion engine vehicles 
p36 Anti-sprawl opinions against CAVs as they may encourage people to move away from dense 
urban centres 
p37 Dual infrastructure (for CAVs and conventional vehicles) is expensive 
p38 Risk of investing in a technology that fails on the market (e.g. if users don't purchase CAVs or 
subscribe to programs that use CAVs) 
p39 New technologies need to be mature and safe before being introduced to users (e.g. safety 
concerns from fatal CAV accidents). 
p40 Fear that cities become built around CAVs, rather than creating a liveable city and adapting 
CAVs to that 
p41 Current international and national laws and regulations are not suitable for CAVs 
p42 Lack of political consensus on visions for the future in cities 
p43 Lack of knowledge and agreement about strategies from local authorities 
p44 Concern that CAVs may increase congestion 
p45 Covid-19 pandemic and fear of shared vehicles 
p46 The ethical question of who has priority when there is a risk for collision between a pedestrian 
and a CAV 
p47 Cyclists are particularly sceptical about CAVs, in terms of safety and access to urban space 
p48 Fear of CAV technology being hacked 
p49 Conspiracy theories and misinformation about new technologies 
p50 The group of people who do not want to give up control of their vehicle 
p51 People who do not like cars 
p52 Elderly people who are sceptical of new technology 
 
